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Agency and Insanity 
STEPHEN P. GARVEY† 
INTRODUCTION 
Around four o’clock on January 20, 1843, Edmund 
Drummond, private secretary to Prime Minister Sir Robert 
Peel, was walking down Parliament Street, headed to 
Downing Street. Another man approached Drummond from 
behind, withdrew a pistol, put it to his back, and pulled the 
trigger. A policeman saw what happened, rushed over, and 
seized the assailant, who had in the meantime reached for 
another pistol. The assailant’s name was Daniel M’Naghten,1 
a wood-turner from Glasgow.2 M’Naghten, it turned out, had 
mistaken Drummond for his real target, Prime Minister 
Peel. Drummond died five days later. The ensuing case 
against M’Naghten would have a profound, and lasting, 
impact on the law of insanity in the Anglo-American world.3 
 
† Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Earlier versions were presented to a 
small group of young criminal law scholars at Northwestern University School of 
Law and to an audience at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I thank all 
those present on those occasions for their thoughtful comments. 
 1. M’Naghten’s name is spelled in different ways in different sources. See, 
e.g., RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF 
DANIEL MCNAUGHTAN xi–xiii (1981); Bernard L. Diamond, On the Spelling of 
Daniel M’Naghten’s Name, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 84 (1964). The spelling followed here 
is the one reflected in the case bearing his name. M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. 
Rep. 718. For accounts of the case, see, for example, DANIEL MCNAUGHTON: HIS 
TRIAL AND THE AFTERMATH (Donald J. West & Alexander Walk eds., 1977); 
MORAN, supra; RICHARD D. SCHNEIDER, THE LUNATIC AND THE LORDS (2009). 
 2. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 143. 
 3. Most U.S. jurisdictions today continue to define insanity in ways traceable 
to the original formulation of the M’Naghten Rules. See Paul H. Robinson et al., 
The American Criminal Code: General Defenses, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 37, 77 
(2015) (stating that the “majority view” of the insanity defense provides that “[a]n 
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M’Naghten was delusional. He attacked Peel because he 
believed members of Peel’s Tory party were out to get him, 
relentlessly persecuting him. In reality, of course, the Tories 
weren’t after him. M’Naghten, however, wasn’t in reality. He 
was in a world of his own, at least when it came to the Tories. 
Earlier, M’Naghten had told the Glasgow police 
commissioner that “he was the object of some persecution, 
and . . . that he thought it proceeded from the priests at the 
Catholic chapel in Clyde Street, who were assisted by a 
parcel of Jesuits.”4 Two days later, he told the commissioner 
that the “Tories had joined with the Catholics,”5 and 
thereafter it was the Tories who, as some witnesses later put 
it, “haunted” him.6 Today, M’Naghten would likely be 
diagnosed as suffering from paranoid psychosis.7 
“The delusions were of such an intensity,” M’Naghten’s 
father testified at trial, “that the Tories were with him day 
and night spying on him . . . they were there every time he 
turned around . . . they laughed at him and shook their fists 
in his face.”8 M’Naghten went to the police for help. He also 
tried to get help from Sir James Campbell, the Lord Provost 
of Glasgow,9 and Alexander Johnston, Glasgow’s Member of 
Parliament,10 all to no avail. According to Johnston, 
M’Naghten “complained of being attacked through the 
newspapers, and said the persons of whom he complained 
 
actor is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a 
result of mental disease or defect he did not know his conduct was wrong.”). 
 4. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 208 (citing transcript). 
 5. Id. at 209. 
 6. Id. at 204 (Jane Drummond Patterson, in whose house M’Naghten had 
lodged two years before the trial, testified that M’Naghten, after three or four 
months, mentioned being “haunted by devils.”); id. at 207–08 (testimony of Rev. 
Alexander Turner that M’Naghten “talked about being haunted” by a number of 
persons). 
 7. See id. at 253. 
 8. Id. at 254. 
 9. See id. at 207. 
 10. See id. at 205. 
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followed him night and day . . . . [H]e thought his persecutors 
would be satisfied with nothing less than his life.”11 
M’Naghten, so far as one can tell, apparently believed he had 
no choice. Killing the Tory prime minister was the only way 
out, a last desperate attempt to end the torment. 
Tried for murder, M’Naghten was acquitted.12 When the 
defense finished presenting its witnesses, the presiding 
judge, Chief Justice Tindal, asked Solicitor General William 
Follett: “[A]re you prepared, on the part of the Crown, with 
any evidence to combat this [defense] testimony . . . , because 
we think if you have not, we must be under the necessity of 
stopping the case. Is there any medical evidence on the other 
side?”13 Follett threw in the towel. “No, my Lord,”14 he 
replied. Justice Tindal then all but directed an acquittal by 
reason of insanity.15 M’Naghten was sent to Bethlem 
Hospital, also known as Bedlam.16 He was eventually 
transferred to Broadmoor Asylum, where he died in 1865.17 
M’Naghten’s case would eventually produce a test for 
insanity bearing his name. The M’Naghten Rule, at least in 
its modern formulations, equates insanity with cognitive 
incapacity. Sometimes the Rule is combined with a test 
equating insanity with volitional incapacity, often called the 
“irresistible impulse” test. Together, these twin incapacities 
constitute what we might call the law’s traditional test for 
insanity. Two alternative tests, proposed but never enacted 
into law, equate insanity in some way with irrationality. Yet 
 
 11. Id. at 205–06. 
 12. See id. at 225. M’Naghten had savings of £750 (probably somewhere 
between $67,000 to $97,000 today) and was able to hire the Victorian equivalent 
of a defense dream-team. See id. at 55; MORAN, supra note 1, at 12. 
 13. Id. at 222. Justice Tindal would later speak for the judges in announcing 
what became known as the M’Naghten Rules. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. at 223–24. 
 16. See id. at 225. 
 17. See id. at 265–66. 
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neither the traditional test, nor the irrationality proposals, 
are entirely persuasive.18 Each faces fair-minded objections. 
But if insanity isn’t incapacity or irrationality, what is it? 
One possibility, described and explored here, proposes that 
insanity be understood at bottom as a defect of consciousness, 
and in particular, as a lost sense of agency. If so, then perhaps 
insanity belongs in the same family as other such defects, 
like sleepwalking, hypnosis, and multiple personality. If 
M’Naghten was insane, then according to the lost agency 
theory, it wasn’t really M’Naghten who killed Drummond. 
That sounds paradoxical, but the lost agency theory tries to 
explain why it’s not. 
The argument unfolds in four moves. Part I tackles and 
finds wanting the traditional test of insanity, which portrays 
insanity as an incapacity, either cognitive or volitional. Part 
II develops two different versions of the irrationality test, 
and finds them wanting too. Part III introduces insanity as 
lost agency, describing its basic features and continuity with 
other defects of consciousness. If the lost agency theory is 
true, then insanity excuses because the insane don’t author 
the thoughts and actions their minds and bodies produce. 
They’re not the agent of the crimes they commit. Part IV 
returns to Daniel M’Naghten, asking whether the lost agency 
theory can account for the intuition that he was indeed 
insane when he shot and killed Edmund Drummond on 
Parliament Street in 1843. 
 
 18. Of course, some evidence suggests that the particular test jurors are told 
to apply actually makes little difference to the verdict they return. Jurors tend to 
return the same verdict whatever the test. See, e.g., HENRY M. STEADMAN ET AL., 
BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 61 (1993) 
(finding that California’s move from the MPC test to M’Naghten in 1982 did “not 
affect use of the insanity defense”); James R.P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity 
Defense Standards on Juror Decision Making, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 509, 526 
(1991) (“[F]or whatever reason, the particular insanity defense standards 
employed do not seem to strongly influence a juror’s decision making.”). Even so, 
we should still try to understand in what insanity consists, even if the legal rules 
we formulate in an effort to capture or define it tend in the end to make little 
difference to how jurors decide concrete cases. 
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I. TRADITION 
When courts announce new rules of law they do so in the 
course of deciding concrete cases or controversies. Usually, 
that is. The most famous test for insanity, the M’Naghten 
Rule,19 wasn’t born in the usual way. The Queen at the time, 
a young Queen Victoria, had been an assassin’s target three 
years before M’Naghten tried to kill her prime minister.20 
Her assailant, Edward Oxford, had been acquitted on 
grounds of insanity, and the Queen was none too happy when 
M’Naghten was acquitted on the same ground. She told the 
House of Lords to ask the fifteen judges of the common law 
courts to explain, once and for all, what made a person insane 
in the eyes of English law. Their pronouncement became 
known as the M’Naghten Rule. Pass the Rule’s test, and you 
go to a hospital; fail, and you go to prison (or worse). 
Criminal lawyers tend to talk about the M’Naghten Rule 
or test, but that’s misleading. In reality, we have today, not 
one M’Naghten test, but two. The old M’Naghten is the one 
the judges of the common law courts announced in 1843. The 
new M’Naghten is a recognizable, modern-day descendant of 
the old—encountered in many state penal codes, as well as 
the federal code. The two belong to the same family, or at 
least share the same family tree, but the words of the old 
M’Naghten differ from the words of the new in more ways 
than one. 
Five questions were put to the judges in M’Naghten’s 
Case. Their answers to three of the five have for some reason 
faded into history.21 What’s passed into the modern canon is 
 
 19. M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718. 
 20. See PAUL THOMAS MURPHY, SHOOTING VICTORIA: MADNESS, MAYHEM, AND 
THE REBIRTH OF THE BRITISH MONARCHY (2012). 
 21. Those who attend to the judges’ answers to all the questions naturally 
tend to speak about the M’Naghten Rules (plural), while those who focus only on 
the answer to the second and third questions, dealing with the “proper questions 
to be submitted to the jury, when a person alleged to be afflicted with insane 
delusion . . . is charged with the commission of a crime,” M’Naghten’s Case, 8 
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the single answer they gave to questions two and three. 
According to the judges’ answer to those questions, a jury 
faced with a plea of insanity should be instructed as follows: 
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly 
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party ac-
cused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of 
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was 
doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what 
was wrong.22 
So says the old M’Naghten. The test is easier to state 
than to understand. Books have been devoted to deciphering 
it.23 Its meaning remains elusive despite all that effort. 
Indeed, maybe it doesn’t even state an all-purpose test for 
insanity, good for any case in which insanity is alleged. The 
judges might have intended to limit their answers to cases 
 
Eng. Rep. at 720, tend to speak of the M’Naghten Rule (singular). 
 22. Id. at 722. In one commonly neglected passage, the judges expressly say, 
in response to the fourth question, that someone “labour[ing] under . . . partial 
delusion only, and . . . not in other respects insane, . . . must be considered in the 
same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the 
delusion exists were real.” Id. at 723. According to at least two influential 
treatises, this language doesn’t add anything to the canonical language cited in 
the text. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
§ 4.2(b)(5), at 445 (1986) (“[I]t is undoubtedly fair to conclude that this particular 
part of M’Naghten [i.e., the answer to question four] does not set up a unique 
formula differing from the right-wrong test.”); A.P. SIMESTER ET AL., SIMESTER AND 
SULLIVAN’S CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND DOCTRINE § 19.1(ii)(f), at 723 (5th ed. 
2013) (“This express provision for partial delusions [in response to question four] 
does not appear to add anything to the substance of the Rules.”). However the 
judges understood the relationship between their answer to the second and third 
questions, and their answer to the fourth question, their answer to the fourth 
question tells us a person suffering from delusions is insane if, assuming his 
delusions had been true, he would not have been criminally liable, which is the 
same test associated with the delusion theory (discussed below). See infra notes 
70, 74 and accompanying text. 
 23. For an in-depth analysis of the old M’Naghten, see HERBERT FINGARETTE, 
THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 234–42 (1972). Fingarette’s theory of 
insanity is commonly characterized as an irrationality theory. See infra notes 47–
48 and accompanying text. Moreover, because Fingarette “read[s] the M’Naghten 
test as saying much the same thing” as the theory he proposes, FINGARETTE, 
supra at 197, perhaps the old M’Naghten should be understood as an irrationality 
test as well. 
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involving defendants who, like Daniel M’Naghten, were 
suffering from what were known, circa 1843, as “partial 
delusions.”24 We won’t add to the existing commentary on 
(and confusion over) M’Naghten’s original meaning. Instead, 
we’ll set the old M’Naghten aside, and move onto the new 
M’Naghten. 
The new M’Naghten comes in different shapes and sizes. 
Different jurisdictions formulate the test in slightly different 
ways. For now, let’s work with the following generic 
statement: a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if 
at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or 
defect he lacks capacity to know the criminality of his 
conduct.25 So stated, the new M’Naghten differs (at least 
superficially) from the old in a few ways, only one of which 
needs emphasis here.26 The old M’Naghten made no explicit 
 
 24. M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 721–22. 
 25. This generic statement of the rule is, of course, similar to the 
corresponding language of Model Penal Code § 4.01(1). It doesn’t reflect the law 
of any particular jurisdiction. For surveys of the law in U.S. jurisdictions, see 
Paul H. Robinson & Tyler Scot Williams, Mapping American Criminal Law: 
Variations Across the Fifty States ch. 14 (Jan. 2, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law School: Legal Scholarship 
Repository); Robinson et al., supra note 3. Among other things, the generic 
statement sidesteps the protracted debate over the meaning of the word “wrong.” 
See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy, Insanity Defenses, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 302–06 (John Deigh & David 
Dolinko eds., 2011) (describing all imaginable meanings of the word “wrong”). It 
simply assumes “wrong” means “criminally wrong,” which is how it has been 
construed in the land where M’Naghten was born. See R v. Windle [1952] QB 826 
at 833 (Eng.). (“The test must be whether an act is contrary to law”); ANDREW 
ASHWORTH & JEREMY HORDER, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(b), at 143 (7th 
ed. 2013). 
 26. The new M’Naghten differs from the old in two other noteworthy ways. 
First, it discards any reference to the accused’s knowledge of the “nature and 
quality” of what he was doing. This prong is commonly omitted because, it’s 
thought, it doesn’t add much, if anything, to the second prong. See, e.g., Clark v. 
Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 753–54 (2006) (“In practical terms, if a defendant did not 
know what he was doing when he acted, he could not have known that he was 
performing the wrongful act charged as a crime.”). Second, the new M’Naghten 
discards any reference to “defect of reason.” This element is frequently omitted 
because, it’s probably thought, it adds nothing to the disease-of-the-mind 
element. Why require a “defect of reason, from disease of the mind”? Aren’t they 
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mention of capacity. It asked if the actor was laboring under 
a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, so as not to know 
the nature and quality of what he was doing, or if he did 
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. 
The new M’Naghten, in contrast, puts capacity front and 
center. An actor isn’t insane unless, as a result of mental 
disease or defect, he not only didn’t realize he was 
committing a crime, but was powerless to so realize.27 What 
defeats liability, according to the new M’Naghten, is an 
actor’s ignorance of the law, provided it resulted from a 
mental disease or defect, and provided he was powerless to 
be anything but ignorant. 
Before going on, we should confront Daniel M’Naghten’s 
responsibility directly. Ignore for a moment what you think 
the verdict on M’Naghten’s sanity would be under this or 
that legal test, and consult your intuitions. Should 
M’Naghten have been found criminally responsible or non-
responsible? Was Bethlem the right place to send him? Or 
should he have gone to the gallows? If you agree with many 
thoughtful commentators, you’d say Bethlem. M’Naghten 
was, to put it bluntly, obviously crazy.28 If so, then Daniel 
 
more or less the same thing? See FINGARETTE, supra note 23, at 178. Fingarette, 
for one, thought not, calling it a “profound mistake” to omit the defect-of-reason 
element from the test’s formulation. Id. at 198. 
 27. See Sinnott-Armstrong & Levy, supra note 25, at 311 (“[T]he M’Naghten 
rule hinged on actual knowledge rather than ability to know.”). The Supreme 
Court slipped easily from the original non-capacity language of the old 
M’Naghten to the capacity language of the new M’Naghten, without noting the 
difference. See Clark, 548 U.S. at 747 (describing the “second part” of the original 
language from M’Naghten as a test for “lack of moral capacity”). 
 28. See MORAN, supra note 1, at 4 (describing this as the “conventional 
wisdom” and citing the work of Fingarette, Biggs, Goldstein, and Rollin); Michael 
Moore, The Quest for a Responsible Responsibility Test: Norwegian Insanity Law 
After Breivik, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 645, 662 (2015) [hereinafter Moore, After Breivik] 
(“Daniel M’Naghten himself . . . would be considered in popular understanding 
as quite crazy.”). The Queen, of course, didn’t think so. Nor did the public at the 
time. If M’Naghten could plan, as he could and did, then he wasn’t insane. Or so 
thought popular opinion. Then again, neither the Queen nor the public heard 
first-hand the evidence presented at trial. Maybe they would have thought 
differently if they had. Moran challenges this conventional wisdom to the extent 
that his aim is “to demonstrate that [M’Naghten’s] mental condition and alleged 
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M’Naghten provides us with a litmus test for insanity tests. 
M’Naghten is to insanity what Linda Brown is to equal 
protection. Any theory of insanity certifying M’Naghten to be 
sane is (for that reason) a bad theory of insanity, just as any 
theory of equal protection asserting Brown wasn’t denied it 
is (for that reason) a bad theory of equal protection. Call this 
the “test of M’Naghten.” If a test for insanity certifies Daniel 
M’Naghten to be insane, it passes the test; if not, it fails. 
The first critical volley against the new M’Naghten 
focused, not on what the test said, but on what it didn’t say. 
Suppose, the critics imagined, someone realized doing this or 
that was a crime, but as a result of mental disease or defect, 
just couldn’t help himself. He was, as one might colloquially 
put it, driven to commit the crime, or as the law sometimes 
puts it, he experienced an “irresistible impulse” to commit 
it.29 If you think such a person should be regarded as insane 
in the law’s eyes, a point of considerable controversy,30 the 
 
delusions of persecution were, at the very minimum, rooted in the political reality 
of his day.” MORAN, supra note 1, at 5. Richard Moran, McNaughtan, Daniel 
(1802/3-1865), OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (online ed. Jan. 2008) 
(M’Naghten was a “former actor and medical student [who] was familiar with the 
symptoms of insanity, and . . . may have been feigning . . . .”). 
 29. A standard citation is to Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 866 (Ala. 1887). 
 30. Stephen Morse is the most prominent and thoughtful critic of so-called 
volitional or control tests for insanity. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Against Control 
Tests for Criminal Responsibility, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 449 (Paul H. 
Robinson et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Morse, Against Control Tests]. Richard 
Bonnie likewise “favor[s] narrowing the defense by eliminating its so-called 
volitional prong or control test.” Richard J. Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the 
Insanity Defense, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1983, at 196. Michael Corrado is probably the 
foremost defender of an approach to insanity based entirely on volitional 
impairment. See, e.g., Michael Corrado, The Case for a Purely Volitional Insanity 
Defense, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 481 (2009). For a recent criticism of Corrado in 
favor of Morse’s position, see Paul Litton, The Mistaken Quest for a Control Test: 
For a Rationality Standard of Sanity, in THE INSANITY DEFENSE: 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY VIEWS ON ITS HISTORY, TRENDS, AND CONTROVERSIES 185 
(Mark D. White ed., 2017). 
Morse maintains that any plausible case in which one might be inclined to 
believe an actor couldn’t have done otherwise than commit the crime charged will 
typically be one in which the actor would be insane under the irrationality theory 
he defends. He says, for example: 
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new M’Naghten would, according to many,31 have to be 
amended, and so in some places it was. The fix was to add 
another prong (sometimes referred to, perspicuously or not, 
as the “irresistible impulse” prong), to wit: a person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct 
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks capacity to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 
The new M’Naghten, together with the irresistible 
impulse addition, comprise what we’ll call the traditional 
test for insanity. The traditional test has an elegant and 
simple structure. It takes two conditions, compelled 
ignorance and compelled choice, and bars criminal liability 
when those conditions are satisfied, provided those 
conditions resulted from a “mental disease or defect.” Anyone 
who satisfies the test is said to be insane. Mental disease or 
defect resulting in compelled choice or compelled ignorance 
is the equivalent of insanity. 
The traditional test doubtless has many problems, but 
let’s focus on two. In order to set the stage for the first 
problem we need to say more about the concept of capacity, 
or incapacity, on which the traditional test depends. How do 
we tell if an actor lacked the capacity, or was powerless, to 
realize he was committing a crime, or to conform his conduct 
 
Suppose . . . that an agent’s desire is so powerful and insistent that it 
compromises the agent’s ability to think straight, to bring reason to bear 
on the reasons not to act. Some people in the throes of intense desire 
may be virtually unable to think of anything except satisfying the desire. 
Indeed, some addicts, for example, describe seeking and using in almost 
automaton-like terms. Their minds are blank, and seeking and using 
‘just happens.’ This is a textbook example of irrationality. 
Morse, supra, at 457 (emphasis added). One doesn’t want to make too much of 
the reference to the fact that addicts and others under the influence of powerful 
and insistent desire sometimes describe their experience in “automaton-like 
terms,” but that’s the language of lost agency, is it not? 
 31. We should note for the record that some defenders of the old M’Naghten 
Rule believed that rule, properly understood and applied, could reach and excuse 
those who acted on an irresistible impulse. See, e.g., 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 167–71 (1883); JEROME HALL, 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 520–22 (1960). 
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to the law? The usual way to test an actor’s capacity is to ask 
a counterfactual question. If the actor would have realized 
he was committing a crime in some imagined world, then 
we’d say he could have realized he was committing a crime 
in this one. Likewise, if the actor would have conformed his 
conduct to the requirements of law in some imagined world, 
then we’d say he could have conformed his conduct to the 
requirements of law in the actual world. 
If this analysis of the language of capacity is correct, then 
much depends on how we describe the imagined world in 
which we put the actor to the test. Indeed, everything 
depends on it. Describe that world in one way, and the 
accused could have chosen or believed otherwise. Describe it 
in another, and he couldn’t have. What’s the right 
description? The traditional test for insanity was, rightly or 
wrongly, commonly understood to require what was 
described as “total” incapacity, which would suggest that the 
possible world in which the accused’s capacities were tested 
should be especially unforgiving. Rare indeed should be the 
case in which the requisite capacity was found lacking. In 
that spirit, we need to imagine some truly demanding and 
remote worlds. 
In order to test an actor’s capacity to realize he was 
committing a crime, let’s assume a world, just like the actual 
world, except that a magistrate magically appears at the 
scene of the crime and tells him in no uncertain terms that 
what he’s about to do is a crime. If the actor would have 
remained ignorant, then (and only then) would we say he 
lacked the capacity to realize he was committing a crime. 
Likewise, in order to test an actor’s capacity to conform his 
conduct to the law (assuming he realizes he’s about to 
commit a crime), let’s assume a world, just like the actual 
world, except a gallows magically appears and the actor will 
immediately find himself hung upon it if he fails to conform. 
If he nonetheless would have chosen to commit it, then (and 
only then) would we say he lacked the capacity to conform. 
Those are especially unforgiving counterfactuals, but 
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presumably something like them is what the traditional 
test’s supposed insistence on total incapacity would entail. 
The first problem now emerges. M’Naghten was probably 
suffering, as we’ve said, from paranoid schizophrenia or 
paranoid psychosis. He was in pretty bad shape, believing 
the Tories were out to get him, haunting him day and night. 
If we apply the traditional test, using the counterfactuals 
just mentioned, then maybe, under the circumstances, 
M’Naghten was insane. Maybe, under the circumstances, he 
either couldn’t have realized he was committing a crime, or 
if he did, couldn’t have done otherwise. 
Maybe, but probably not. If a judicial magistrate had 
miraculously and suddenly appeared before M’Naghten, 
telling him that shooting Drummond would offend the 
queen’s peace, and constitute a crime, would M’Naghten 
have understood what he was being told? Would he then 
have known he was about to commit a crime? Probably. 
Indeed, according to some well-informed observers, 
M’Naghten, even without the aid of our imagined 
magistrate’s counsel, “made no mistakes about what he was 
doing—he knew he was shooting, and he knew that he was 
killing—nor was he ignorant of the legal and moral 
prohibitions against killing.”32 If so, then M’Naghten 
would’ve struck out on the traditional test’s first prong. 
Likewise, if the gallows had miraculously and suddenly 
appeared on Parliament Street as M’Naghten approached 
Drummond, and if M’Naghten believed he’d be immediately 
hung upon it if he proceeded, would he have done an about-
face? Again, probably, at least according to our well-informed 
observers, who believe “no very persuasive case [exists] for 
saying that M’Naghten was compelled to do what he did.”33 
If so, then he would’ve struck out on the second prong, too. 
If Daniel M’Naghten is the litmus test for insanity tests, 
then the traditional test probably fails. Under the traditional 
 
 32. Moore, After Breivik, supra note 28, at 662. 
 33. Id. 
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test, Daniel M’Naghten would probably have been found 
sane and hung for his crime. Indeed, the traditional test, 
straightforwardly applied, probably does a pretty poor job 
overall sorting the intuitively sane from the intuitively 
insane. Worse, its likely tendency is to produce false-
negatives. When all is said and done, it probably sends to 
prison more folks who should go to a mental hospital than it 
sends to mental hospitals folks who should go to prison. If 
anything, the traditional test allocates the risk of error in the 
wrong direction. 
The natural response to this worry was to loosen the 
language, moving away from total incapacity to something 
less than total. The Model Penal Code (MPC) showed the 
way, declaring in Section 4.01(1): 
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such 
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law.34 
Section 4.01 preserves the basic structure of the 
traditional test. Vagueness was its innovation. First, it 
removes the word “know” and substitutes the word 
“appreciate,” on the theory that even someone who was 
insane might “know” he was committing a crime, but still not 
“appreciate,” the criminality of his conduct, where 
appreciation was meant to convey some deeper or broader, 
but ill-defined, mode of understanding.35 Second, recognizing 
that capacities come in degrees,36 the Code spurned the total 
incapacity thought to be required under the traditional test, 
providing instead that a “lack of substantial capacity,” either 
 
 34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 35. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 4.01 cmt. 3 at 169 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1985) (“The use of ‘appreciate’ rather than ‘know’ conveys a broader sense 
of understanding than simple cognition.”). 
 36. Michael S. Moore, The Neuroscience of Volitional Excuse, in LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE 179, 188 (Dennis Patterson & Michael S. Pardo eds., 2016) 
[hereinafter Moore, Neuroscience]. 
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cognitive or volitional, would suffice to establish the 
defense.37 Demanding total incapacity, as the traditional test 
presumably did, was intuitively too demanding. Section 4.01 
is thus the traditional test, only kinder, and more forgiving.38 
Does Section 4.01 pass the test of M’Naghten? Would it 
have found M’Naghten insane? Hard to say. Some might 
think so; others might think not. That’s the beauty of 
vagueness. It gives discretion, inviting reliance on intuition. 
Maybe that’s not such a bad thing. Indeed, sometimes it’s a 
virtue. If intuition can reliably sort the sane from the insane, 
what need has the law for a rule? Of course, if the law can 
focus and guide discretion in a way that’s helpful on balance, 
so as to sort the cases more accurately than would reliance 
on intuition alone, it should. So, again, the MPC rule might 
or might not pass the test of M’Naghten. The MPC is softer 
than the traditional test, and being softer, naturally offers 
M’Naghten a better chance, all else being equal, to avoid the 
gallows based on a finding of insanity. Of course, a better 
chance is no guarantee. A jury instructed in the language of 
Section 4.01 might well find M’Naghten sane, despite the 
latitude Section 4.01 provides. 
Even if the MPC, unlike the traditional test, passes the 
test of M’Naghten, it faces another problem, which the 
traditional test also faces. The MPC, like the traditional test, 
has two elements: a mental-disease-or-defect element and a 
liability-precluding element. The problem involves the 
 
 37. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 4.04 at 172 (emphasis 
added) (Substantial capacity means “a capacity of some appreciable magnitude 
when measured by the standard of humanity in general, as opposed to the 
reduction of capacity to the vagrant and trivial dimensions characteristic of the 
most severe afflictions of the mind.”). 
 38. The story of M’Naghten’s evolution ends, of course, with John Hinckley’s 
attempt on the life of then-President Reagan. Prior to Hinckley’s attempt, the 
Model Penal Code’s test was on the rise; afterward, in a reaction echoing Queen 
Victoria’s to M’Naghten’s acquittal, many jurisdictions removed any reference to 
the accused’s capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 
Congress, for example, enacted 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2012), which makes no explicit 
reference to the accused’s capacity for conformity. 
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relationship between them. Both tests stipulate that the 
mental-disease-or-defect element must cause a liability-
precluding element. But why does the liability-precluding 
element preclude liability only when it results from a mental 
disease or defect? Set aside the scandalous fact that the 
criminal law seldom, if ever, defines “mental disease or 
defect.” That’s bad enough. What’s worse is its failure to 
explain why the law needs it in the first place. What work 
does the mental-disease-or-defect requirement do? If 
someone lacked the capacity, or substantial capacity, to 
know (or appreciate) the law or conform to its requirements, 
why isn’t that enough, all by itself, to defeat liability? 
Maybe the mental-disease-or-defect requirement is a 
proxy for something else. Maybe it guarantees that anyone 
pleading insanity qua incapacity didn’t culpably cause her 
incapacity. It guarantees, in other words, that the insane 
don’t have dirty hands. If your incapacity arises from a 
mental disease or defect, then presumably you’re not to 
blame for being so incapacitated. Mental disease just 
happens. No one sets out to make themselves insane. That’s 
sensible, but then the mental-disease-or-defect requirement 
isn’t really integral to insanity. The mental-disease-or-defect 
requirement turns out to be nothing more than a clean-hands 
rule.39 Can that be right? Surely mental disorder is more 
tightly bound to insanity than that.40 
Moreover, if the mental-disease requirement is just a 
 
 39. See, e.g., GARY WATSON, Excusing Addiction, in AGENCY AND 
ANSWERABILITY: SELECTED ESSAYS 318, 333 (2004). The criminal law typically 
excuses someone when, as a result of involuntary intoxication, but not voluntary 
intoxication, he lacks the capacity to know or conform to the law. See, e.g., MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 2.08(4). This set of rules, too, suggests that the mental-disease-or-
defect requirement functions like a clean-hands proxy. 
 40. Perhaps anyone who lacks the capacity to know he’s committing a crime, 
or who can’t conform to the law if he does know it, must necessarily be suffering 
from something fairly called a “mental disease or defect.” But that won’t do, at 
least not for the traditional test or the MPC test. Under those tests, mental 
disease or defect causes an incapacity. If mental disease or defect is just another 
way to identify the relevant incapacity, then it can’t cause that incapacity. 
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clean-hands proxy, it suffers, like any proxy, from over- and 
under-inclusion. First, with regard to under-inclusion, 
suppose Sally is faultlessly incapacitated due to mental 
disease or defect. When she kills Jane, insanity comes to 
Sally’s rescue. Contrast John, who’s faultlessly incapacitated 
due to something else. When he kills Jane, he’s out of luck. 
No insanity defense for him. That doesn’t seem fair. Why 
should it matter why you’re incapacitated, as long as you’re 
not at fault? Second, with regard to under-inclusion, suppose 
Sally is incapacitated due to mental disease or defect, but 
decides not to take her medicine. Without the medicine, the 
symptoms from which she suffers will return, and she’ll be 
incapacitated once more. All this she knows. If Sally, now 
incapacitated, kills Jane, she’ll still be entitled to plead 
insanity, at least under existing law.41 That doesn’t seem 
entirely fair either. 
The traditional test gives us the following recipe for 
insanity. Step one: start with a standard liability-precluding 
condition, i.e., compelled ignorance or compelled choice. Step 
two: add a mental-disease-or-defect condition (leave 
undefined). Step three: require the element in step one to 
result from the element in step two. Voila: insanity. Maybe 
one lesson from the traditional test’s shortcomings is to 
rethink the starting point. Rather than a traditional 
excusing condition, like compulsion or ignorance, maybe one 
should start instead with the idea that mental disease or 
defect is in itself somehow the key to insanity, that mental 
disease or defect can’t simply be an ill-fitting proxy for clean 
hands. 
History gives one well-known example of this approach. 
It comes from the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, in its 1954 decision in United States v. Durham.42 
 
 41. One possible exception to this generalization, and perhaps the only one, 
is Washington law, which provides that “[n]o condition of mind induced by the 
voluntary act of a person charged with a crime shall constitute insanity.” WASH. 
REV. CODE § 10.77.030(3) (1998). 
 42. 214 F.2d. 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
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It began with promise, but didn’t end well. The court—
especially Durham’s author, Judge David Bazelon—was 
dissatisfied with the traditional test. His main complaint 
was that it left the jury without a complete portrait of the 
accused’s state of mind at the time of the crime, and without 
a complete portrait, how could the jury fairly say whether he 
was insane or not? Durham thus threw out the traditional 
test, and replaced it with a single-sentence alternative: “[A]n 
accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was 
the product of mental disease or defect.”43 
This rule, known as Durham Rule, or product test, is as 
notable for what it doesn’t say as much as for what it does. 
Unlike the traditional test, it makes no mention whatsoever 
about incapacity. Indeed, it makes no effort to identify 
anything that amounts to a condition precluding liability, 
like compelled ignorance or choice. On the contrary, what 
precludes liability under Durham is the simple fact that the 
actor suffered from a mental disease or defect, provided said 
mental disease or defect caused his unlawful act. Besides 
wanting a test that enabled the jury hear more about the 
defendant’s state of mind than the traditional tests were 
thought to allow, why Judge Bazelon opted for the test he did 
is hard to know. Whatever the motivation, the Durham Rule 
itself presupposed that mental disease or defect, or at least 
some mental diseases or defects, sufficed to preclude criminal 
 
 43. Id. at 874–75. The Durham Rule doesn’t explain why a person who 
wouldn’t have committed a crime but for the fact that he was suffering from 
something called a mental disease or defect shouldn’t be criminally liable. Some 
take the Rule to rest on what’s been called a causal theory of excuse, which isn’t 
really a theory of excuse at all. A theory of excuse presupposes some people are 
responsible for some choices they make, at least some of the time, and a theory 
of excuse sorts the excused from the unexcused. Yet the causal theory of excuse 
(so-called) entails that no one is responsible for any choice she makes at any time. 
If so, if no one is responsible for any choice she makes, including the choice to 
commit a crime, and insofar as punishment can permissibly be imposed only on 
those who are responsible for their choices, then punishment, on the causal 
theory, is never permissible. The causal theory of excuse leads penal abolitionism. 
For some this conclusion is a reductio; for others, the beginning of enlightenment. 
For the latter perspective, see, for example, DERK PEREBOOM, FREE WILL, AGENCY, 
AND MEANING IN LIFE 153–74 (2014).  
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liability, with no incapacity required, provided the mental 
disease or defect produced the unlawful act. 
The Durham court may have been onto something. Alas, 
the court didn’t see what it was, and the rot soon set in. At 
its source was the court’s failure to define “mental disease or 
defect.” At trial, the prosecution would present its experts, 
who would solemnly testify that the accused suffered from no 
mental disease or defect. The defense would then present its 
experts, who, with equal solemnity, would testify that he did, 
and moreover, his crime was a product of it. Who was to say 
who was right? The experts were, after all, the experts, at 
least when it came to saying what was and wasn’t a mental 
disease or defect. The battle of the experts left the jury 
caught in the crossfire. Far from bringing its normative 
judgment to bear on the question of sanity, the jury was 
reduced to arbitrating credibility. Which side’s experts were 
more believable? 
When the court finally got around to defining “mental 
disease or defect,” it missed its chance. Rather than 
identifying what it was about some mental diseases and 
defects such that suffering from them was in itself somehow 
inconsistent with criminal liability, and in some way 
different from the ways in which suffering from the 
traditional liability-precluding conditions was inconsistent 
with criminal liability, the court took a turn back to the 
traditional tests. A “mental disease of defect,” the court said 
almost a decade after Durham, included “any abnormal 
condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or 
emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior 
controls.”44 
Ring any bells? It should. The traditional test said that 
a mental disease or defect had to cause some liability-
precluding condition, like lacking the capacity to conform to 
the requirements of law. The refined Durham test said a 
 
 44. McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (per 
curiam). 
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mental disease or defect had to cause “substantially impaired 
behavior controls,” otherwise it wasn’t a “mental disease or 
defect” at all, at least not so far as the law of insanity was 
concerned. When push came to shove, the D.C. Circuit thus 
did an about face and returned to tradition,45 with something 
like compulsion—“substantially impaired behavioral 
controls”—coming to the fore.46 The gravitational pull of the 
old ways proved hard to escape. 
II. IRRATIONALITY 
The D.C. Circuit eventually abandoned Durham and 
embraced the Model Penal Code in its stead. Following the 
acquittal of John Hinckley, on grounds of insanity, for his 
 
 45. The Court’s ongoing efforts to patch up the Durham Rule in response to 
problems arising from its application eventually led the Court to abandon it 
altogether in favor of the then-recently promulgated MPC rule. See United States 
v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The product rule survives in 
New Hampshire, where it arguably first took root, and in the Virgin Islands. See 
State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 438 (1869); Petric v. People, 61 V.I. 401, 408 (2014). 
 46. When Durham was finally laid to rest in Brawner, Judge Bazelon took 
another stab at it. Here’s what he came up with: “[A] defendant is not responsible 
if at the time of his unlawful conduct his mental or emotional processes were 
impaired to such an extent that he cannot justly be held responsible for his act.” 
Brawner, 471 F.2d at 1032 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). Bazelon thus went one more step (or more) beyond the MPC on the path 
toward vagueness. Better, perhaps, to dispense with anything like a test for 
insanity altogether; instead, formulate a “test” that gets all the facts in front of 
the jury and invites its members to decide the ultimate question of responsibility 
using common sense and intuition. That was more or less also the majority 
recommendation of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in 1953. See 
ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT, 1949–1953, ¶ 333(iii), at 
116 (1953) (“[A] preferable amendment of the law would be to abrogate the 
[M’Naghten] Rule and to leave the jury to determine whether at the time of the 
act the accused was suffering from disease of the mind (or mental deficiency) to 
such a degree that he ought not to be held responsible.”). Getting the ultimate 
question to the jury, without any more by way of guidance from the law, was 
probably the hoped-for effect of the New Hampshire doctrine as well, which is 
usually, though perhaps mistakenly, taken to be equivalent to the Durham Rule. 
See John Reid, Understanding the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity, 
69 YALE L.J. 367, 396 (1960) (claiming that the “ends sought by New Hampshire 
[were] . . . to discard legal presumptions and give the jury the full fact-finding 
duty”). 
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attempted assassination of President Reagan, many states 
went back to M’Naghten. The tradition, in one guise or 
another, prevailed. Still, dissatisfaction with the traditional 
test lives on. At bottom, this discontent rests on the 
conviction that the traditional test misunderstands insanity 
because it sees nothing special about the insane. That, so say 
the discontented, must be wrong. The traditional test takes 
the oldest excuses in the book—ignorance and compulsion—
and says that insanity appears when those excuses happen 
to result from a mental disease or defect, which is then left 
mysteriously undefined. That can’t be right. Insanity must 
be something more, and something else. But what? 
Enter the irrationality theory. The theory’s champions 
naturally agree that irrationality is somehow the touchstone 
of insanity, but their accounts differ in detail and nuance, 
making it hard to tell exactly what the theory stands for. 
Maybe it would be better to talk about irrationality theories, 
which bear a familial resemblance to one another, but 
differing in important ways.47 As usual, the devil in is the 
 
 47. Michael Moore and Stephen Morse are today’s most prominent 
irrationality revisionists. See infra note 67. They don’t agree on everything, 
however. For one thing, they embrace different theories of insanity as 
irrationality, as discussed in the text. Moore believes insanity is a status defense 
or exemption that, when applicable, bars liability for all of an accused’s acts or 
choices committed while insane; Morse believes insanity is an excuse that, when 
applicable, excuses some acts or choices, but not all. Moreover, Moore would make 
room for a separate excuse based on lack of capacity to control one’s choices, or 
conform one’s choices to the requirements of law. See Moore, Neuroscience, supra 
note 36, at 179 (offering an analysis of “volitional excuse”). Morse sees no need 
for such an excuse, or if such a need exists, apparently believes its costs would 
exceed its benefits, so the law shouldn’t adopt it. 
For earlier discussions commonly included in the irrationality camp, see JOEL 
FEINBERG, What Is So Special About Mental Illness?, in DOING AND DESERVING: 
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 272 (1970); Herbert Fingarette, Insan-
ity and Responsibility, 15 INQUIRY 6 (1972); FINGARETTE, supra note 23, at 175–
94; Herbert Morris, Criminal Insanity, 17 INQUIRY 345 (1974) (reviewing 
HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY (1972)). Robert 
Schopp is also commonly included. See ROBERT F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, 
AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 215 
(1991). Lumping all these theorists in the same camp makes sense insofar as they 
all stand opposed to the traditional test, and insofar as they all make some appeal 
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details. 
What supposedly unites all irrationality theories is, once 
more, the proposition that insanity somehow involves 
irrationality. We might therefore formulate the irrationality 
theorist’s test for insanity thusly: an actor is insane if he’s 
irrational. Alas, if that’s all the theory tells us, it doesn’t tell 
us nearly enough.48 M’Naghten was, let’s agree, irrational in 
some sense, but he knew how to put two and two together. 
He knew how to plan an attack on the prime minister. He 
knew how to work a gun. Wasn’t he rational, at least 
instrumentally? Conversely, we’re all irrational more or less, 
more or less of the time.49 Weakness of will, for example, is 
an all-too-common form of practical irrationality. The same 
goes for self-deception, which is an all-too-common form of 
epistemic irrationality. What we need to know is when 
irrationality veers into insanity. Without an answer, 
insanity risks being like pornography: we know it when we 
see it. 
So let’s try to make irrationality more precise. Let’s 
 
to the idea of irrationality, but it also risks obscuring important differences 
among them. 
For example, some passages in Feinberg’s important essay on insanity echo 
the lost-agency theory: 
‘[S]enseless’ desires, because they do not cohere, are likely to seem alien, 
not fully expressive of their owner’s essential character. When a person 
acts to satisfy them, it is as if he were acting on somebody else’s desires. 
And, indeed, the alien desires may have a distinct kind of unifying char-
acter all their own, as if a new person were grafted onto the old one. 
Feinberg, supra, at 288 (emphasis added). Indeed, in a footnote to this passage, 
Feinberg writes: “Hence the point of the ancient metaphor of ‘possession.’” Id. at 
288 n.4. 
 48. See FINGARETTE, supra note 23, at 179 (“[T]he word ‘irrational’ is used in 
a number of very different senses.”); Sinnott-Armstrong & Levy, supra note 25, 
at 317 (“[T]he term ‘rational’ is vague and controversial.”). See generally Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong, Insanity vs. Irrationality, 1 PUB. AFF. Q. 1 (1987) (criticizing 
irrationality theories proposed by Feinberg, Moore and Fingarette). 
 49. Stephen Morse emphasizes that rationality is a “continuum concept.” See, 
e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 301 (2003). 
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distinguish two different irrationality theories: irrationality-
as-unintelligibility and irrationality-as-delusion.50 Both 
theories say that insanity is in some way related to psychosis. 
The unintelligibility theory says that insanity consists in 
being psychotic, where being psychotic is a “degree-vague 
assessment of severity in a variety of mental abilities” 
indicating “severe abnormalities of behavior.”51 The delusion 
theory says (as a first approximation) that insanity consists 
in psychotic choices or acts, where a psychotic choice or act is 
a choice or act based on delusion. 
A. Unintelligibility 
Irrationality is a matter of degree. According to the 
unintelligibility theory, the insane are just that much crazier 
than the rest of us. The “irrationality associated with 
insanity is a deep[], . . . radical kind of irrationality.”52 But 
“deep” and “radical” how? The unintelligibility theory 
portrays insanity’s irrationality as deep and radical in two 
ways.53 First, insanity is deep, insofar as it constitutes a 
 
 50. Prior to Thomas Erskine’s defense of James Hadfield in 1800, existing 
English authority, such as it was, appears to have equated legal insanity with 
what was then called “total” insanity, or what’s here called irrationality-as-
unintelligibility. Erskine argued that “total” insanity wasn’t necessary for legal 
insanity. What was then called “partial” insanity should, he thought, suffice. As 
Erskine said in Hadfield, in some cases “reason is not driven from her seat [total 
insanity], but . . . [instead] distraction sits down upon it along with her, holds 
her, trembling, upon it, and frightens her from propriety [partial insanity].” Trial 
of James Hadfield, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281, 1313 (1800). If partial insanity is 
equivalent to what’s described here as irrationality-as-delusion, then the 
M’Naghten Rules reflected the delusion theory in the judges’ answer to the fourth 
question put to them by the House of Lords. For some historical analyses that 
can be read in support of this claim, see, for example, Joel Peter Eigen, Delusion 
in the Courtroom: The Role of Partial Insanity in Early Forensic Testimony, 35 
MED. HIST. 25 (1991); Richard Moran, The Modern Foundation for the Insanity 
Defense: The Cases of James Hadfield (1800) and Daniel McNaughtan (1843), 477 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOCIAL SCI. 31 (1985). 
 51. Moore, After Breivik, supra note 28, at 656. 
 52. FINGARETTE, supra note 23, at 179. 
 53. Moore’s latest statement can be found in Moore, After Breivik, supra note 
28. Earlier statements can be found in MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: 
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property, not of acts, but of actors. It attaches not just to 
what a person does. It goes deeper, attaching to the person 
himself. Second, the irrationality must be so radical that the 
person becomes unintelligible to us, so unintelligible that it 
no longer makes sense to look upon him as a moral agent at 
all. 
When a person ceases to be an agent, it makes no sense 
to get angry at him for anything he does, crimes included. 
Resentment and indignation are misplaced, just as they are 
when an animal causes harm, inasmuch as animals aren’t 
moral agents. One might say that the insane, as non-agent 
persons, are “beyond good and evil,”54 or perhaps “not 
operating within the realm of reason at all.”55 They are, as 
the unintelligibility theory’s foremost proponent has put it, 
“stranger to us than birds in our garden.”56 We should treat 
them with compassion, as we should any sentient creature. 
We might want to confine them if they’re dangerous. But 
blaming them, being resentful or indignant toward them, 
makes no sense. Blame presupposes moral agency, and 
calling someone insane is just another way of saying she’s 
not a moral agent at all. 
The mental illness typically afflicting the unintelligible 
is some form of schizophrenia. Schizophrenia is commonly 
associated with hallucinations and delusions, but its positive 
symptoms also manifest in “word salad,” “thought-blocking,” 
and neologisms, as well as agitated and repetitive 
movements; or, at the other extreme, catatonia.57 These are 
 
RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 217–45 (1984); Michael S. Moore, Mental Illness 
and Responsibility, 39 BULL. MENNINGER CLINIC 308 (1975), reprinted in MICHAEL 
S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 595–609 (1997). 
 54. Moore, After Breivik, supra note 28, at 678. 
 55. R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 289 (2007). Duff suggests that “if a person is so disordered that he 
is not operating within the realm of reason at all, he should be described as ‘a-
rational’ or ‘a-reasonable’ rather than irrational or unreasonable.” Id. 
 56. Moore, After Breivik, supra note 28, at 678 (quoting Manfred Bleuler, 
described as the “‘father’ of schizophrenia”). 
 57. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
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the images of the insane that the unintelligibility theory 
most naturally evokes. Or think about some of the more 
florid inmates of the Bridgewater Asylum for the Criminally 
Insane, depicted in Frederick Wiseman’s 1967 documentary 
Titicut Follies. Other words come to mind: raving, rambling, 
bizarre, deranged, delirious, incoherent, and so on. Or 
perhaps: “[T]otally deteriorated, drooling, hopeless[ly] 
psychotic[].”58 You get the basic idea. Most of us doubtless 
would have a hard time regarding such creatures as fellow 
travelers. We are, as the unintelligibility theory says, apt to 
look upon them as something less than human, beings so 
disintegrated or disordered as to be non-agents. 
Insanity’s history is replete with analogies. The 
unintelligibility theory analogizes the insane to wild beasts 
or brutes.59 The analogy is usually traced to Judge Robert 
Tracy’s jury charge in the 1724 trial of Edward Arnold, but 
its antecedents go back to 1256.60 Early English law 
 
MENTAL DISORDERS 99 (5th ed. 2013); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NAT’L 
INST. MENTAL HEALTH, SCHIZOPHRENIA 3–4 (2015), https://infocenter.nimh.
nih.gov/pubstatic/NIH%2015-3517/NIH%2015-3517.pdf. 
 58. GREGORY ZIBOORG, MIND, MEDICINE AND MAN 273 (1943). 
 59. Moore, After Breivik, supra note 28, at 678–79. 
 60. See Anthony Michael Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins and 
Development of the “Wild Beast” Concept of Mental Illness and Its Relation to 
Theories of Criminal Responsibility, 1 J. HIST. BEHAV. SCI. 355, 361 (1965) 
(tracing the history of the “wild beast” concept back from Tracy to Hale to Coke 
and finally to Bracton). According to Platt and Diamond: 
The “wild beast” concept emerged finally in the seventeenth century as 
a result of a mistranslation of “brutis” . . . Bracton’s use of “brutis” was 
in fact shorthand for “brutis animalibus,” which may literally be trans-
lated as “brute” or “dumb animals.” This expression and idea was used 
particularly by the canonists to distinguish man from animals. Bracton 
correctly observed that “animals which lack reason” do not possess the 
will or intent to do harm; consequently, they are not to be considered 
legally accountable. It was quite legitimate for Bracton to include the 
insane in this conceptual framework because they too, like dumb ani-
mals, were considered lacking in will and understanding. 
Id. at 360–61. The wild beast analogy might actually fit the lost-agency theory as 
well as, if not better than, the unintelligibility theory. The basic idea would be 
that animals in general lack a sense of themselves as agents insofar as they lack 
a sense of agency. 
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distinguished between “total insanity” and “partial 
insanity,”61 and the wild beast analogy was meant to 
illuminate what it was to be totally insane. As Judge Tracy 
said: a person isn’t insane unless “totally deprived of his 
understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is 
doing, no more . . . than a brute, or a wild beast.”62 The 
unintelligibility theory, which embraces the wild beast 
analogy,63 thus limits insanity to total insanity. Total 
insanity, however, is a Procrustean theory of insanity. 
Make no doubt about it. If someone qualifies as insane 
under the unintelligibility theory, then insane he is. That’s 
not the problem. False positives are the problem. The 
unintelligibility theory is under-inclusive: it will too often 
put the seal of sanity on the certifiably insane. Take Daniel 
M’Naghten. M’Naghten was crazy, but not so crazy we can’t 
make any sense of him. We might not understand why he 
thought the Tories were out to get him, but if killing the 
prime minster was the only way to stop them, then killing 
the prime minister was an intelligible thing to do. Nor was 
M’Naghten so crazy that he couldn’t figure out how to make 
the attempt. He was able to come up with a plan and put it 
into action. He wasn’t “totally deprived” of reason. Yet if we 
agree that an adequate theory of insanity should certify 
M’Naghten insane, the unintelligibility theory fails the test. 
That’s one strike.64 
 
 61. See, e.g., Eigen, supra note 50, at 27 (“Legal tracts written by Sir Matthew 
Hale and Lord Coke, together with judicial instructions dating to the late 
eighteenth century, reveal that juries were traditionally instructed that only a 
total want of memory and understanding—a total insanity—would satisfy the 
law’s criterion for exemption from culpability.”). 
 62. Trial of Edward Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 693, 765 (1724) (emphasis added). 
 63. Moore, After Breivik, supra note 28, at 678–79. 
 64. Moore maintains that M’Naghten would qualify as insane under the 
unintelligibility theory. See Moore, After Breivik, supra 28, at 662. Others would 
reasonably disagree. What the disagreement highlights, perhaps, is another 
point Moore makes; namely, that the “line separating persons from non-persons,” 
the intelligible from the unintelligible, is not so much a line as a gray zone. Still, 
portraying M’Naghten as having passed some threshold into unintelligibility, as 
having entered a zone wherein he’s “stranger to us than birds in our garden,” 
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Next, suppose M’Naghten had been insane under the 
unintelligibility theory. Suppose he was like a wild beast. If 
so, he shouldn’t be held criminally liable for the attempt on 
Drummond’s life. The problem is that, if he’d been as crazy 
as the unintelligibility theory requires, he probably wouldn’t 
have committed the crime in the first place. Crimes don’t 
require cunning, but they do usually require coherence. The 
non-agents of the unintelligibility theory are, one imagines, 
so disorganized it would be miraculous if they could pull it 
together enough to even be able pull a trigger.65 Maybe some 
can, but not many. If so, then the unintelligibility theory is a 
 
doesn’t seem quite right. History’s descriptions of M’Naghten, and the 
unintelligibility theory’s description of the insane, don’t mesh very well. Here is 
one account of how M’Naghten behaved while in prison awaiting trial: 
What would become increasingly interesting about M’Naughten was the 
fact that his demeanor throughout his time in prison was always pre-
cisely the same. He always appeared calm and composed. He had a 
hearty appetite and ate well. He appeared very attentive to conversa-
tions between other people in the jail: other prisoners, attorneys, police 
guards, and is said to have frequently laughed at any jocular observa-
tions that were made. 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 29–30. On its face, that doesn’t sound like someone 
who’s “stranger to us than birds in our garden.” Morse makes much the same 
observation more generally about people suffering with psychotic disorders. See 
Stephen J. Morse, Moore on the Mind, in LEGAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL 
TRUTHS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL MOORE 240 (Kimberly Kessler Ferzan & 
Stephen J. Morse eds. 2016) [hereinafter Morse, Moore on the Mind] (“People with 
psychotic disorders may be perfectly capable of substantive and instrumental 
rationality in some, indeed most areas of their lives . . . [T]hey are not ‘stranger 
to us than the birds in our gardens,’ nor are they ‘beyond good and evil’ . . .. Each 
is recognizably one of us.”) (quoting Michael Moore, The Quest for a Responsible 
Responsibility Test: Norwegian Insanity Law After Breiuik, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 
645, 678 (2015)). 
 65. FINGARETTE, supra note 23, at 206 (“[T]here are those whose mental 
powers have generally so deteriorated for one reason or another that the 
individual has become permanently incapable of the most elementary self-care or 
interpersonal intercourse.”); Morse, Moore on the Mind, supra note 64, at 241 
Morse, infra note 64, at 241 (“[T]hose people who are omni-disabled are usually 
too disorganized to engage in criminal conduct other than simple assaultive or 
disorderly conduct, for which no sensible defendant raises an insanity defense.”). 
As Thomas Erskine put it in his defense of Hadfield, cases in which “reason is not 
merely disturbed, but wholly driven from her seat . . . are not only extremely rare, 
but never can become the subjects of judicial difficulty.” Trial of James Hadfield, 
27 How. St. Tr. at 1313. 
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test for insanity that will seldom, if ever, be used or needed. 
That’s another strike. 
Now, the unintelligibility theorist might insist that 
M’Naghten was irrational enough to be called insane. That 
seems unlikely, but suppose he was. Now suppose 
M’Naghten, as delusional as ever, decides, not to kill the 
prime minister, but instead to steal a bowler, not because he 
was irresistibly driven to it, but just because he wants to look 
dapper and doesn’t feel like paying. He knows full well that 
he’s stealing and stealing is a crime. His theft has nothing to 
do with his delusions. He doesn’t, for example, believe 
stealing a bowler will be a blow against the Tory 
establishment. Still, he remains as delusional as he was on 
the day he shot Drummond. Is M’Naghten guilty of theft? 
What says the unintelligibility theory? It would be obliged to 
say M’Naghten is not guilty, because he was insane. Insanity 
attaches to persons, not to their choices or acts; or perhaps 
better: insanity attaches to persons, and because it attaches 
to persons, it attaches to all their choices and acts, including 
M’Naghten’s imagined theft of the bowler. If M’Naghten was 
insane, then according to the unintelligibility theory, he 
could literally do no wrong. 
That’s a hard bullet to bite.66 M’Naghten’s delusions had 
 
 66. FINGARETTE, supra note 23, at 208 (“[T]here seems no good moral reason 
why, in general, a person who is persistently irrational about food should not 
nevertheless be held responsible in connection with his business dealings.”); 
Morse, Moore on the Mind, supra note 64, at 241 (“[P]eople with severe mental 
disorders . . . may be competent or morally responsible for some conduct.”); 
Anthony Kenny, Can Responsibility Be Diminished?, in LIABILITY AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 1, 24–25 (R.G. Frey & Christopher Morris eds., 1991) (“Treating 
madness as a status rather than a factor . . . gives a certified mental patient a 
license which is not given to others: he knows there are certain things he may do 
without being held criminally responsible, while all others not of the same status 
will be held responsible.”). Morse and Kenny also argue that treating insanity as 
a status defense or exemption is also, in one way or another, stigmatizing. See 
Kenny, supra, at 24–25 (“Treating madness as a status . . . attaches stigma to 
insanity by assuming, without any need of proof, that insanity predisposes to 
criminal action.”); Morse, supra at 243 (expressing concern that treating insanity 
as a status excuse “would contribute, albeit marginally, to common 
misunderstandings and fear of mental disorder that continue to stigmatize and 
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nothing to do with hats. A new chapeau wouldn’t end his 
persecution. If so, would the state really be out of line if it 
condemned him for pinching the bowler? If not, then insanity 
can’t be based on status, as the unintelligibility theory says. 
Insanity can’t be like infancy. Children of a certain age might 
be able to do no wrong, but the same doesn’t go for the insane, 
unless, of course, insanity is limited to those who really are 
unintelligible to us. Yet, if insanity is so circumscribed—if 
only the unintelligible are insane—then the insane will be 
lucky enough to survive in the world, unless someone’s 
looking after them. They’re unlikely to be going around 
committing crimes. The unintelligibility theory is left in a 
bind. If it says M’Naghten was sane, it fails the test of 
M’Naghten. If it says M’Naghten was insane, then 
M’Naghten gets a pass for any crime he commits. Neither 
horn has great appeal. Strike three. 
B. Delusion 
Let’s tack to the other irrationality theory: irrationality-
as-delusion.67 For starters, let’s agree that delusions are 
 
exclude people with such disorders”). 
 67. Morse has set forth his account in various places over the past twenty 
years. The language he uses to describe what makes an actor irrational 
sometimes differs slightly from one presentation to another, but so far as one can 
tell, nothing of substance is meant to turn on these differences. See, e.g., Morse, 
Moore on the Mind, supra note 64; Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587 (1994); Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, 
Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289 (2003); Stephen J. Morse, 
Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 251 (2000); Stephen J. Morse 
& Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal Insanity and Mens Rea: 
Beyond: Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 1124 (2008); 
Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1025 (2002). 
Morse sometimes says that an actor is insane if he lacks sufficient ability to 
grasp and be guided by good reasons. See, e.g., Morse, Against Control Tests, su-
pra note 30, at 454 (“The capacity to grasp and be guided by good reason is the 
heart of normative rationality.”) (emphasis added). Referring to the ability to be 
guided by good reason has led some commentators to argue that Morse smuggles 
a volitional or control test into his irrationality test. See, e.g., Michael S Moore, 
Compatibilism(s) for Neuroscientists, in LAW AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION 1, 
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irrational beliefs. They’re irrational inasmuch as they don’t 
respond to evidence contradicting them, no matter how 
rationally compelling the countervailing evidence may be. 
M’Naghten, for example, believed the Tories were out to get 
him. Time and again he was told the Tories were not out to 
get him, to no avail. Nothing, let’s agree, would have 
convinced him otherwise. 
Delusions come in different shapes and sizes. Some are 
self-contained. If you suffer from what’s known as Capgras 
delusion, you delusionally believe your spouse is an imposter, 
but the delusion usually doesn’t prompt violence. You don’t, 
for example, decide to confront the imposter, or go out 
looking for your real spouse.68 Other delusions don’t sit idly 
 
51 (Enrique Villanueva ed., 2014) (“Morse’s catch basket here, ‘irrationality,’ in-
cludes a ‘rational capacity to be guided by reasons on the particular occasion of 
wrongdoing, in addition to the general irrationality constitutive of true craziness. 
This particular incapacity returns Morse to his own can’t/won’t distinction, how-
ever much he wishes to step away from that distinction.”); Michael Louis Corrado, 
Morse on Control Tests, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 461, 462 (Paul H. Rob-
inson et al., eds. 2009) (“The capacity to grasp is indeed an element of rationality; 
but the capacity to be guided by reasons is a control notion.”). That’s an under-
standable interpretation, but probably not the one intended. What Morse proba-
bly means is that an actor can’t be guided by good reasons if he can’t grasp them 
in the first place, and someone who’s delusional can’t grasp good reasons, or at 
least can’t grasp any reason capable of dislodging his delusions. 
When the dust settles, the irrationality-as-delusion theory and the judges’ 
answer in M’Naghten to question four, end up, so far as one can tell, saying more 
or less the same thing; namely, that an accused suffering from delusions isn’t 
criminally liable if, assuming his delusions were real, he wouldn’t be guilty of the 
crime charged. For discussions of M’Naghten emphasizing the language from the 
answer to question four, see, for example, Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 865 (Ala. 
1887) (“The rule in McNaghten’s Case . . . is that the defense of insane delusion 
can be allowed to prevail in a criminal case only when the imaginary state of facts 
would, if real, justify or excuse the act.”); Davis v. State, 28 S.W.2d 993, 996 
(Tenn. 1930) (“Under [McNaughten’s Case] . . . a homicide committed under an 
insane delusion is excusable, if the notion embodied in the delusion and believed 
to be a fact, if a fact indeed, would have excused the defendant.”); Sinnott-Arm-
strong & Levy, supra note 25, at 301–02 (“[T]he judges in M’Naghten’s case pro-
posed a counterfactual test” according to which an accused “‘labour[ing] under . . . 
partial delusions only . . . must be considered in the same situation as to respon-
sibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real.’”) (quot-
ing M’Naghten Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 723). 
 68. Every rule has an exception. Frith and Johnstone describe “one extreme 
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by. Delusionally believing the Tories were out to get him, 
M’Naghten decided to take action. He came to believe that 
his only option was to assassinate Peel. M’Naghten’s 
delusion was irrational, but once that delusion became fixed 
in his mind, the decision to kill Peel looks not only 
intelligible, but perfectly rational. M’Naghten did the cost-
benefit analysis. Better to kill than (eventually) be killed. 
Still, at the root of his rational decision to go after Peel was 
the irrational delusion that Peel and his ilk were coming 
after him. 
The delusion theory differs from the unintelligibility 
theory in two ways. First, irrationality is understood, not as 
a property of persons, but as a property of choices or acts. 
The unintelligibility theory exempts persons from criminal 
liability. The delusion theory excuses choices or acts. Second, 
a choice or act is irrational insofar as it rests on an irrational 
belief, i.e., a delusion. M’Naghten’s choice to make an 
attempt on Peel’s life was insane because the practical 
reasoning leading him to that choice was irrational, and the 
practical reasoning leading to that choice was irrational 
because it rested on an irrational belief: the delusion that the 
Tories were out to get him.69 Thus, so far as one can tell, the 
delusion theory tells us that a choice is insane if a delusion 
has infected the practical reasoning leading to it. M’Naghten 
was insane because his choice to kill Peel rested on a delusion 
of persecution. 
Alas, the traditionalist is apt to be unmoved. He’ll gladly 
concede that M’Naghten’s choice to make an attempt on 
Peel’s life rested on delusion. He tried to kill Peel only 
because he irrationally believed the Tories were ruining his 
 
case [in which] a [Capgras] patient who believed that his step-father had been 
replaced by a robot subsequently decapitated him to look for batteries and 
controls in his head.” See CHRISTOPHER FRITH & EVE JOHNSTONE, SCHIZOPHRENIA: 
A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 140 (2003). 
 69. Morse, Moore on the Mind, supra note 64, at 240 (“We excuse [on grounds 
of insanity] when substantive irrationality [i.e., delusion] impairs the agent’s 
practical reasoning in the context in question.”). 
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life. But, the traditionalist will ask, who cares? If we assume 
that M’Naghten, despite his delusions, could have realized 
he was committing a crime, and if he could have conformed 
to the law and not have committed it, what difference does 
his delusion make? In other words, the traditionalist wants 
to know why a delusion-inspired choice, without more, 
should preclude liability, when ex hypothesi the choice itself 
was neither compelled nor made in compelled ignorance. For 
the traditionalist, what should matter is whether 
M’Naghten, delusional or not, had the capacity to realize 
killing Peel was a crime, and if so, whether he had the 
capacity to stop himself. 
The delusion theorist might at this point reply that he’s 
been misunderstood. Not all choices based on delusions are 
insane. Some are; some aren’t. A deluded choice is insane 
only if, had the actor’s delusions been real, the choice 
wouldn’t have been a crime.70 For example, assuming 
 
 70. Morse might agree with this statement of the irrationality-as-delusion 
theory, but one can’t be entirely sure. Compare Morse & Hoffman, supra note 67, 
at 1129 (“Some agents . . . act for such irrational reasons that it would be unjust 
to blame and punish them whether or not they would be justified if the facts and 
circumstances were as they delusionally believed.”) (emphasis added), with 
Morse, Moore on the Mind, supra note 64, at 243 (suggesting that a delusional 
actor should be convicted if he would still be guilty of a crime “even if all the facts 
and circumstances as he believes them to be were true”). Morse writes: “For years 
I waffled on this issue, but now believe that the delusional spouse must be 
convicted.” Morse, Moore on the Mind, supra note 64, at 243. The delusional 
spouse is someone whose decision to kill his wife is based on “delusional jealousy,” 
but who would still be guilty of a crime even if his delusions were true. If Morse 
does indeed embrace the delusion theory, that embrace would become hard to 
reconcile with the claim that insanity is a matter of more or less, inasmuch as 
irrationality is a matter of more or less. See Morse & Hoffman, supra note 67, at 
1118 (“The capacity for rationality . . . is clearly a continuum concept.”). The 
delusion theory asks if the accused would be guilty of a crime if his delusions were 
true. That question would appear to invite a yes-or-no answer, however much 
disagreement might exist over whether yes or no is the right answer. 
For those familiar with the criminal-law literature, this statement of the de-
lusion theory will sound familiar. It sounds like Christopher Slobogin’s “integra-
tionist” alternative to any affirmative test for insanity. Slobogin proposes 
(roughly) abolishing any affirmative defense of insanity and instead applying ex-
isting criminal-law doctrines to the facts as the defendant believed them to be, 
whether his beliefs are delusional or not. See Christopher Slobogin, An End to 
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M’Naghten’s delusions about the Tory spies were real, his 
decision, say, to steal a bowler, would still be a crime. 
Stealing the bowler would do nothing to end the persecution, 
and M’Naghten would therefore be guilty of larceny, despite 
his delusions. In contrast, eliminating Peel was, M’Naghten 
delusionally believed, the only way he could end his torment. 
If we assume that killing Peel really was the only way 
M’Naghten could end his torment, would he be guilty of 
murder? That, according to the delusion theory, is the critical 
question. 
What’s the answer? It depends. Let’s take self-defense off 
the table. M’Naghten attacked Drummond, not the other way 
round. M’Naghten never claimed Drummond was an 
imminent threat to his life or limb.71 M’Naghten might 
nonetheless claim that Peel’s death, compared to his own 
continued suffering, was the lesser evil. In other words, 
M’Naghten might try to justify his attempt on Peel’s life in 
the name of necessity. Would that have worked under the 
law of necessity circa 1843? Probably not, if only because 
 
Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 1199, 1199–1208 (2000) [hereinafter Slobogin, An End to Insanity]. Alas, 
“subjectivizing” the criminal law to the extent the integrationist test requires 
would necessitate substantial reform of existing doctrine. See, e.g., Morse & Hoff-
man, supra note 67, at 1128 (stating that Slobogin is “incorrect about the extent 
of subjectivization current law accepts”); Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of the 
Integrationist Test as a Replacement for the Special Defense of Insanity, 42 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 523, 532–33 (2009) (noting that if the law isn’t sufficiently “subjec-
tive,” then a “‘special defense’ for offenders with mental illness would still be 
needed, albeit one that focuses solely on whether, at the time of the crime, they 
lacked subjectified mens rea or believed they were confronted by circumstances 
that would be justifying or coercive if true”) [hereinafter Slobogin, A Defense]. As 
Slobogin notes, his integrationist theory is “virtually identical” to the “Partial 
Delusion defense announced . . . in M’Naghten” in response to question four. 
Christopher Slobogin, The Integrationist Alternative to the Insanity Defense: Re-
flections on the Exculpatory Scope of Mental Illness in the Wake of the Andrea 
Yates Trial, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 315, 335 (2003). 
 71. See Slobogin, An End to Insanity, supra note 70, at 1203 (“Whether 
M’Naghten would have been acquitted under the . . . [integrationist] approach 
would depend on whether he believed the harassment would soon lead to his 
death or serious bodily harm and whether he thought there was any other way 
to prevent that occurrence.”). 
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common-law necessity didn’t extend to murder.72 Nor would 
it have worked today, since English law still doesn’t 
recognize necessity as a defense to murder.73 Much the same 
would go for common-law duress, which likewise didn’t 
extend to murder. M’Naghten might have had better luck in 
a different time or place. The Model Penal Code, for example, 
contemplates necessity and duress, under the right 
circumstances, as defenses to homicide, though most 
jurisdictions don’t follow the Code on that score. If a jury 
were asked to decide if M’Naghten, assuming his delusion 
were true, chose the lesser evil, or killed under duress, who 
knows what it would do.74 
The delusion theory rests its verdict, sane or insane, on 
the law applied to the accused’s delusional world. It requires 
stepping into the actor’s crazy world and applying the law to 
the facts as they exist in that crazy world. Take the case of 
James Hadfield of England, circa 1800.75 Hadfield believed 
his death was necessary in order to bring forth the second 
coming of Christ. He also believed that his death had to be at 
someone’s hand other than his own, else the second coming 
would not come. So Hadfield decided he had to kill King 
George III, which would cause the King’s successor to 
 
 72. One can get picky about this. According to one contemporary treatise on 
English law, “[u]nder current law, Dudley [and Stephens] is regarded as 
authority that necessity is unavailable for murder. But, on the facts, Dudley need 
not have decided any specific rule for murder.” SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 22, § 
21.3(ii)(e), at 805. Dudley and Stephens is, of course, the famous English 
cannibalism case, but it wasn’t decided until 1884, over forty years after 
M’Naghten. 
 73. See id. 
 74. One might think any claim of lesser evils or duress would founder because 
M’Naghten, even within his delusional world, had other options to protect himself 
from the Tories short of killing the prime minister. Why, for instance, didn’t he 
go to the police and tell them what the Tories were doing to him? One reply, of 
course, is that he did, and was told nothing could be done. Perhaps from within 
his delusional world, M’Naghten believed the state had abandoned him. An 
analogy might be to a battered spouse who kills her sleeping abuser believing 
that the state, after her repeated but failed efforts to get help from the 
authorities, will not protect her. 
 75. Trial of James Hadfield, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281 (1800). 
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execute him for treason, and thus would Christ come again. 
Was Hadfield, under the delusion theory, sane or not? 
According to the delusion theory, it depends: is it a crime 
to kill the king if killing the king is necessary to bring Christ 
into the world? Well, once again, necessity probably wasn’t 
at the time a defense to homicide, let alone when the target 
is the King. Then again, it is Christ we’re talking about.76 Is 
it permissible to sacrifice the King (in order to sacrifice 
oneself in order) to bring about the Second Coming? It 
probably depends on whether you believe in Christ in the 
first place, but set that complication aside. Isn’t the real 
problem the question itself? The delusion theory throws up 
the question, but the question itself seems a little crazy. The 
criminal law is created for our world, not delusional ones.77 
All else being equal, a test that avoids crazy questions is 
better than one that turns on them. 
Time to switch gears. Each of the tests for insanity 
discussed above—the traditional test, the MPC, Durham, 
and the irrationality twins—are tests for the accused, which 
he can either pass and be labeled insane, or fail and be 
 
 76. James Fitzjames Stephen (a judge at the time) had this to say about the 
verdict in Hadfield’s Case: “My own opinion . . . is that, if a special Divine order 
were given to a man to commit murder, I should certainly hang him for it unless 
I got a special Divine order not to hang him. What the effect of getting such an 
order would be is a question difficult for any one to answer till he gets it.” 2 
STEPHEN, supra note 31, at 160 n.1. 
 77. Slobogin tries to address this objection in Slobogin, A Defense, supra note 
70, at 539–42. Judge Ladd, in State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871), wasn’t 
impressed with the delusion theory. Referring to the answer given to question 
four in M’Naghten, he wrote: 
The doctrine thus promulgated as law has found its way into the text 
books, and has doubtless been largely received as the enunciation of a 
sound legal principle since that day. Yet it is probable that no ingenuous 
student of the law ever read it for the first time without being shocked 
by its exquisite inhumanity. It practically holds a man confessed to be 
insane, accountable for the exercise of the same reason, judgment, and 
controlling power, that is required of a man in perfect health. It is, in 
effect, saying to the jury, the prisoner was mad when he committed the 
act, but he did not use sufficient reason in his madness. 
Id. at 387–88. 
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labeled sane. The traditional test and the MPC, for example, 
ask if the accused had the power, more or less, to know or 
appreciate he was committing a crime, or whether he had the 
power, more or less, to do otherwise. Durham asks if the 
accused’s mental disease or defect caused him to commit the 
crime. The irrationality tests ask if the accused was so 
irrational he was no longer an agent at all, or if his crime 
would not have been criminal if his delusions had been true. 
For all their differences, each of these tests shares one thing 
in common. They each presuppose that the accused was the 
one in control of his choices at the time of the crime. They 
each presuppose that the accused was the author of his 
actions. What, though, if he wasn’t? That brings us to 
insanity as lost agency. 
III. LOST AGENCY 
When you move your hand you experience your hand 
moving, and you experience yourself moving your hand. Your 
hand is moving, and you’re the one moving it. In other words, 
when you move your hand you experience a sense of 
ownership (it’s my hand) and a sense of agency (it’s me 
moving it).78 These experiences then lead you to believe that 
the moving hand is yours, and that the author or agent of its 
movements is you. Our experiences of ownership and agency 
are commonplace. We take them for granted. So much so that 
they fade into the phenomenal background. We hardly ever 
 
 78. Research on the sense of agency is a relatively new development. See Tim 
Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie, Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of 
Agentive Self-Awareness, 159 SYNTHESE 475, 475 (2007) (“Until recently, neither 
philosophers nor psychologists had much interest in the awareness of one’s own 
agency. This is no longer the case, and there is now a burgeoning literature on 
the mechanisms underlying ‘the sense of agency.’”). For recent collections, see, 
for example, AGENCY AND SELF-AWARENESS: ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY AND 
PSYCHOLOGY (Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan eds., 2003); DECOMPOSING THE 
WILL (Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein & Tillmann Vierkant eds., 2013); 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF THE SENSE OF AGENCY: FROM CONSCIOUSNESS TO ACTION 
(Michela Balconi ed., 2010); SENSE OF AGENCY: EXAMINING AWARENESS OF THE 
ACTING SELF (Nicole David, James W. Moore & Sukhvinder Obhi eds., 2015); THE 
SENSE OF AGENCY (Patrick Haggard & Baruch Eitam eds., 2015). 
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notice them. We take them for granted. Simple, right? 
Not always. Take Dr. Strangelove. The character in 
Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 film of the same name was an odd 
duck, but perhaps the oddest thing about him was that hand. 
It seemed to have a mind and will of its own. The good 
doctor’s affliction has a name: alien hand syndrome.79 Those, 
like the doctor, who suffer from this syndrome experience 
and believe the moving hand is theirs. What they don’t 
experience or believe is that they’re the one moving it. They 
experience a sense of ownership without a sense of agency. 
Their hand is moving, but they’re not moving it. Someone, or 
something, external or alien to them, to their sense of self, is 
in control. Many “refer to their alien hands as ‘imps’ or 
‘devils.’”80 
Most of us are lucky. We don’t suffer from alien hand 
syndrome. But most of us have driven a car, and driving a 
car, or any other over-learned behavior, can provide a 
glimpse of what it’s like to lose one’s sense of agency, though 
doubtless well short of the real McCoy.81 We sometimes go on 
auto-pilot. We drive, but have no sense of driving. We might 
talk about “highway hypnosis.” Psychologists might talk 
 
 79. To be more precise, loss of a sense of agency without loss of a sense of 
ownership is called anarchic hand syndrome. See, e.g., Elisabeth Pacherie, The 
Anarchic Hand Syndrome and Utilization Behavior: A Window onto Agentive 
Self-Awareness, 22 FUNCTIONAL NEUROLOGY 211 (2007). Loss of a sense of agency 
and ownership is called alien hand syndrome. See Clelia Marchetti & Sergio Della 
Sala, Disentangling the Alien and Anarchic Hand, 3 COGNITIVE 
NEUROPSYCHIATRY 191 (1998). 
 80. SAM KEAN, THE TALE OF DUELING NEUROSURGEONS 257 (2014). 
 81. See Tim Bayne & Neil Levy, The Feeling of Doing: Deconstructing the 
Phenomenology of Agency, in DISORDERS OF VOLITION 49, 56 (Natalie Sebanz & 
Wolfgang Prinz eds., 2006) (“Although it seems to be true that experiences of 
authorship are recessive or dampened in the context of automatic actions (or, at 
least, actions which we experience as automatic), we doubt that the 
phenomenology of authorship is entirely lacking from such experiences.”); Patrick 
Haggard, Conscious Intention and the Sense of Agency, in DISORDERS OF VOLITION 
69 (Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz eds., 2006); Matti Vuorre & Janet Metcalfe, 
The Relation Between the Sense of Agency and the Experience of Flow, 43 
CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 133 (2016). 
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about automaticity.82 Some musicians and athletes might 
describe it as “flow,” or being “in the zone.”83 They lose a 
sense of being in control of what they’re doing. A virtuoso 
might say, in order to try to capture the experience, that the 
“music just took over.” Of course, zoning out is a far cry from 
alien hands. For one thing, the flow stops if something 
interrupts it, and once interrupted, the actor regains the 
sense of agency.84 You zone back in. Focus won’t restore the 
sense of agency to an anarchic hand, however. 
Insanity, on the account offered below, is alien hand 
syndrome writ large. What makes an act insane is the fact 
that actor has no sense of agency at the time he performs it. 
He experiences the action as the action of his body, but fails 
to experience himself as its author. He doesn’t experience 
himself as in control of what he’s doing, because he doesn’t 
experience himself as doing it. Imagine Dr. Strangelove’s 
hand hits you. You’d be upset, but you wouldn’t (once you 
calm down) blame him. He didn’t hit you. His hand did. 
Likewise, if insane Jane kills John, Jane’s not to blame. Jane 
didn’t kill John. Jane’s body did. Blame and censure 
presuppose responsibility, responsibility presupposes 
agency, and agency presupposes a sense of agency. Jane 
lacked agency, because she lacked a sense of agency, on the 
theory of insanity proposed here. 
This theory needs a name. Call it the lost-agency 
theory.85 Of course, like most things having to do with the 
 
 82. John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of 
Being, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 462, 468 (1999).  
 83. See, e.g., LÁSZLÓ HARMAT ET AL., FLOW EXPERIENCE: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
AND APPLICATIONS (2016); Vuorre & Metcalfe, supra note 81. 
 84. Some psychologists might describe this phenomenon as shifting from 
what they call System 2 (the automatic system) back to System 1 (the deliberative 
system), where the shift itself is under the command of System 2. Something 
happens to interrupt the flow, at which point System 2 relinquishes control back 
to System 1. On System 1 and System 2 generally, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, 
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 19–30 (2011). 
 85. John Deigh hints at the lost-agency theory in his overlooked essay, Moral 
Agency and Criminal Insanity, in EMOTIONS, VALUES, AND THE LAW 196, 207–10 
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mind, one’s sense of agency can doubtless be diminished or 
reduced, as opposed to being lost altogether.86 For ease of 
 
(2008) (An insane action “does not issue from the actor’s exercise of his agency. 
He is not its author.”). Deigh draws on the work of Harry Frankfurt, who’s 
famously associated with an account of moral responsibility consisting in a mesh 
or harmony between what Frankfurt calls one’s higher-order volitions and one’s 
effective first-order desires. Basically, your choices are free (and you’re therefore 
responsible for them) if your first-order desires, which move you to act, mesh with 
your higher-order volitions; your choices are unfree (and you’re therefore not 
responsible for them) if your high-order volitions and first-order desires don’t 
mesh. Moreover, if they don’t mesh, that means you qua your higher-order 
volitions are alienated from you qua your first-order desires. It goes without 
saying that the sense of alienation involved in anarchic hand syndrome and lost 
agency is of a far different and more profound sort than the sense Frankfurt had 
in mind. 
Compare the lost-agency theory to theories that locate insanity in a broader 
character theory of excuse, according to which (roughly) insanity excuses be-
cause, when someone who’s insane commits a crime, his act is, as a result of men-
tal disease or defect, “out of character.” See LAWRIE REZNEK, EVIL OR ILL? 
JUSTIFYING THE INSANITY DEFENCE 237 (1997) (“When illness makes a person act 
out of character, we are inclined to excuse him on the basis of a change in moral 
character.”). Character theories of excuse, found more in the criminal-law litera-
ture than in the philosophical literature, have long faced stern challenges. Ap-
plied to insanity, for example, one might ask about the case in which the person 
has long been insane, such that whatever wrong he does, far from being out of 
character, is actually in character. Should he be excused? The character theory 
of insanity would presumably say no, but that seems counter-intuitive. Unlike 
the character theory, which says insanity excuses because crimes committed 
while the accused was insane are out of character for the accused, the lost-agency 
theory says insanity bars liability because the accused didn’t commit the crime 
in the first place. 
 86. Besides being a matter of more or less, lost agency can probably come and 
go. See Matthis Synofzik et al., The Experience of Agency: An Interplay Between 
Prediction and Postdiction, 4 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL. 1, 6 (2013) (“Agency 
attribution in patients with delusions of influence [or control] . . . fails only 
episodically and only in certain contexts.”) [hereinafter Synofzik et al., Experience 
of Agency]. 
Criminal law theorists within the irrationality camp debate whether insanity 
is an excuse or an exemption (or status excuse). See infra note 47 and accompa-
nying text. Excuses are pleas that attach to acts. Exemptions are pleas that at-
tach to actors. If insanity is an excuse, it defeats liability for particular actions. 
If insanity is an exemption, it defeats liability for any action the actor performs 
over whatever period of time he’s exempt, i.e., during whatever period of time he 
occupies the responsibility-defeating status. The lost-agency theory elides this 
dichotomy. On the one hand, when an actor’s sense of agency is lost, he’s not on 
the hook for anything he does within that interval. In that sense, insanity looks 
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exposition, however, let’s introduce the theory on the 
assumption that the sense of agency is all-or-nothing.87 
A. The Demon Within 
Metaphors are a risky business. They can illuminate, but 
they can also mislead. Having put that disclaimer on the 
table, here’s a metaphor for lost-agency. 
Call it the alien-self metaphor. Before an actor loses his 
sense of agency the only self around is the actor himself. Call 
that self the real self. When the sense of agency is lost, 
another self emerges. Call that self the alien self. Now we 
have two selves, so to speak, in the same body. Before the 
split the real self was in charge. Once the sense of agency is 
lost the real self loses command. The alien self takes over. 
The real self becomes a passive bystander to the actions of a 
body he continues to experiences as his own, but no longer 
 
like an exemption. Assuming lost agency isn’t usually, if ever, a permanent con-
dition, that it can come and go, one needs to ask whether it was present or absent 
at the time of the crime. In that sense, insanity looks like an excuse. 
 87. The neuropsychological process by which the sense of agency arises has 
produced an enormous literature. The dominant model is known as the 
comparator model. See, e.g., Sarah-Jayne Blakemore et al., Abnormalities in the 
Awareness of Action, 6 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 237 (2002); Christopher D. Frith 
et al., Abnormalities in the Awareness and Control of Action, 355 PHIL. TRANS. 
ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1771 (2000); Christopher D. Frith, 
Explaining Delusions of Control: The Comparator Model 20 Years On, 21 
CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 52 (2012). For more or less accessible introductions, 
see ANIL ANANTHASWAMY, THE MAN WHO WASN’T THERE: INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE 
STRANGE NEW SCIENCE OF THE SELF 112–15 (2015); Markus Schlosser, Agency, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 29–30 (2015). For recent criticisms of the comparator 
model, and attempts to upgrade it, see, for example, Matthis Synofzik, 
Comparators and Weightings: Neurocognitive Accounts of Agency, in THE SENSE 
OF AGENCY, supra note 78, at 289; Bayne & Pacherie, supra note 78; Matthis 
Synofzik et al., Beyond the Comparator Model: A Multifactorial Two-Step Account 
of Agency, 17 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 219 (2008) [hereinafter Synofzik et 
al., Two-Step Account]; Synofzik et al., Experience of Agency, supra note 86. Of 
course, telling when someone has acted without a sense of agency isn’t easy. 
Studies of the phenomenon usually rely on self-reporting or something called 
“intentional binding.” See, e.g., James W. Moore & Sukhvinder S. Obhi, 
Intentional Binding and the Sense of Agency: A Review, 21 CONSCIOUSNESS & 
COGNITION 546 (2012). The former is vulnerable to fabrication; the latter can only 
be tested in a laboratory. 
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experiences himself as the author of what his body does. His 
actions are thus at once both his and not his. His body is 
acting. Intentions are being formed and volitions are being 
executed to produce bodily movement, but he doesn’t 
experience himself as the author of any of it. 
The alien-self metaphor has antecedents in the history 
of insanity. Once upon a time the insane were, as we’ve seen, 
compared to wild beasts and children. Once upon a time as 
well, however, they were compared to something else: those 
who were possessed.88 An insane person was likened to 
someone demonically possessed, someone whose body an 
alien self had overtaken: someone with a demon within.89 
 
 88. See, e.g., ROY PORTER, MADNESS: A BRIEF HISTORY 10–33 (2002) (chapter 
entitled “Gods and demons”); ROY PORTER, MIND-FORG’D MANACLES: A HISTORY OF 
MADNESS IN ENGLAND FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE REGENCY 63 (1987) (“One 
mark of possession by the Devil was insanity.”); DANIEL N. ROBINSON, WILD 
BEASTS & IDLE HUMOURS: THE INSANITY DEFENSE FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 
74–112 (1996) (chapter entitled “Possession & Witchcraft”); ANDREW SCULL, 
MADNESS IN CIVILIZATION: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF INSANITY FROM THE BIBLE TO 
FREUD, FROM THE MADHOUSE TO MODERN MEDICINE 67–69 (2015) (section entitled 
“Demonic Possession and Spiritual Healing”). For a recent historical account of 
possession and exorcism in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, see BRIAN 
P. LEVACK, THE DEVIL WITHIN: POSSESSION & EXORCISM IN THE CHRISTIAN WEST 
(2013). 
 89. Consider Andrea Yates, who drowned her children to save their souls. 
According to one account: “Mrs. Yates believed that Satan was within her and 
tormented her and the children. She thought after she drowned her children, she 
would be arrested and executed. She indicated that Satan would be executed 
along with her.” Phillip J. Resnick, The Andrea Yates Case: Insanity on Trial, 55 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 147, 149 (2007) (emphasis added). Yates, like James Hadfield 
over 150 years earlier, killed wanting, or at least believing, she would be executed 
as a result. Yates killed to kill Satan; Hadfield, to summon Christ.  
Or consider Andrew Goldstein who, in January 1999, “picked . . . up [Kendra 
Webdale], and threw her onto the tracks in front of . . . [a New York City subway] 
train just as it entered the station.” CHARLES PATRICK EWING, INSANITY: MURDER, 
MADNESS, AND THE LAW 116 (2008). Goldstein described his experience in a vide-
otaped statement to the police: 
As I was standing on the platform there was a woman standing waiting 
for the train. She was facing the incoming train and I was standing be-
hind her. I got the urge to push, kick or punch. I pushed the woman who 
had blond hair. I don’t recall what she looked like. But I know she was a 
white female. When I pushed her she fell onto the track and was struck 
by the train . . .  
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The lost-agency theory gives new meaning to this crazy old 
idea. “The devil made me do it” is a lame excuse,90 but when 
it comes to insanity it may contain a kernel, or perhaps more 
than a kernel, of truth. In fact, possession may have been 
behind the old wild-beast analogy, inasmuch as “animals and 
the insane were both considered embodiments of evil 
spirits.”91 
When the alien self takes charge, the real self is still on-
board, but helpless. The alien self responds to reasons as it 
 
I feel like an aura, or a sensation like you’re losing control of your motor 
system. And then, you lose control of your sense and everything. And 
then you feel like something’s entering you. Like you’re being inhabited. I 
don’t know. But—and then, and then it’s like an overwhelming urge to 
strike out or push or punch . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). Thanks to Joshua Kleinfeld for the reference to Goldstein’s 
remarks. 
What about John Hinkley? How would he have fared under the lost-agency 
theory? Without knowing all the facts, offering a prediction is, of course, hazard-
ous. Having said that, the conventional wisdom, so far as one can tell, was then, 
and is now, that Hinckley was sane, thus the adverse reaction to his acquittal on 
grounds of insanity. In the popular imagination, Hinckley is thought to have suf-
fered from erotomania, also known as de Clerambault’s syndrome, i.e., he delu-
sionally believed Jodie Foster was in love with him, which somehow prompted 
his assassination attempt. In fact, Hinckley realized Foster was not in love with 
him. See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE: THE 
TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. 41–42 (3d ed. 2008). Though not suffering from 
the delusions associated with erotomania, Hinckley may nonetheless have been 
delusional. The experts who testified at trial disagreed. The defense psychiatrists 
testified that Hinckley was psychotic, suffering in particular from delusions of 
reference; the Government’s psychiatrists testified that Hinckley was non-psy-
chotic. See BONNIE ET AL., supra, at 31. (“Perhaps the most significant divergence 
of clinical opinion about Hinckley’s mental disorder at the time of the offense 
pertained to whether or not Hinckley had ‘delusions’ and ‘ideas of reference.’”). If 
the Government’s witnesses were right, then one red flag indicating lost-agency 
would have been missing in Hinckley’s case. That’s about as much as one can 
honestly say looking at the case from afar. 
 90. See Moore, Neuroscience, supra note 36, at 201. 
 91. Platt & Diamond, supra note 60, at 363 (“Catholic dogma distinguished 
human beings from animals, assigning to Man the possibility of an immortal soul. 
At the same time, animals were considered appropriate objects of punishment 
and excommunication. One means of reconciling these views, endowing animals 
with intelligence and souls without contradicting Christian dogmas, was to 
assume that they were incarnations of evil spirits.”). 
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goes about its business, which might include the business of 
crime. It can plan and premeditate, and indeed, its plans can 
be quite intricate. It can look out for the police. It can lock 
doors, flee from danger, and so forth. It can also be impulsive, 
and act with what appears to be utter disregard for the 
consequences. The alien self has a mind and will of its own. 
It might respond to reasons the real self would never respond 
to, and fail to respond to reasons to which the real self would 
consistently respond. The alien self’s reasons don’t integrate 
or cohere with the real self’s reasons, making it natural to 
describe the insane as dis-integrated or in-coherent. 
Lost agency isn’t the traditional control, or irresistible 
impulse, test of insanity in disguise. It’s easy to confuse the 
two. Someone claiming to be insane under the traditional 
test might well say, “I couldn’t control myself.” Someone 
claiming to be insane under the lost-agency theory might 
well say the same thing. The similarity is superficial, 
however. The sense in which control is lost under the 
traditional test, and the sense in which it’s lost under the 
lost-agency theory, are very different. Under the traditional 
theory the question is whether the actor could have chosen 
otherwise than he did. Under the lost-agency theory, in 
contrast, the question is whether the actor at the time of 
choice experienced himself as the one doing the choosing. “I 
wasn’t in control,” is a plea of a different order from “I 
couldn’t control myself.” The former pleads lost-agency; the 
latter, compulsion. 
The real self can react to its lost sense of agency in 
different ways, and different actors can describe the 
experience of lost agency in different language. Faced with 
the “vague and strange experience”92 of having one’s body 
move without moving it, one possibility is simple 
bewilderment. The real self knows his body performed an 
 
 92. Synofzik et al., Experience of Agency, supra note 86, at 5; Synofzik et al., 
Two-Step Account, supra note 87, at 228 (Lost agency is experienced as “strange, 
peculiar and not fully done by me.”). 
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action, but having failed to experience himself as its author, 
might well have no idea why he did what he did, i.e, why his 
body did what it did. Or he might report having acted for one 
reason or another but with no experience of those reasons as 
his reasons. He might describe himself as an onlooker or 
detached observer. If asked why he did what he did, he might 
reply: “It wasn’t me.” “I don’t know what happened.” “It just 
happened.” “I don’t know why I did it.” Or he might be 
reduced to (apparent) paradox: “I did it, but I didn’t do it,” as 
in “I (my body) did it, but I (as agent) didn’t.” 
Or he might go a step further, into delusion.93 Faced with 
 
 93. The literature on delusion, neglected by criminal-law theorists, is very 
large. For helpful overviews, see, for example, Lisa Bortolotti, Delusion, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2013); Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono, Recent Work on 
the Nature and Development of Delusions, 10 PHIL. COMPASS 636 (2015); Max 
Coltheart et al., Delusional Belief, 62 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 271 (2011) [hereinafter 
Coltheart et al., Delusional Belief]; Forum—Phenomenological and 
Neurocognitive Perpsectives on Delusions, 14 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 164 (2015). For 
book-length treatments, see, for example, LISA BORTOLOTTI, DELUSIONS AND 
OTHER IRRATIONAL BELIEFS (2010); PHILIP GERRANS, THE MEASURE OF MADNESS: 
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, AND DELUSIONAL THOUGHT 
(2014); JENNIFER RADDEN, ON DELUSION (2011); LAWRIE REZNEK, DELUSIONS AND 
THE MADNESS OF THE MASSES (2010). 
The literature tends to organize around four questions. First: Are delusions 
beliefs or something else? For defenses of the traditional doxastic account against 
critics, see, for example, Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie, In Defence of the Dox-
astic Conception of Delusions, 20 MIND & LANGUAGE 163 (2005); Lisa Bortolotti, 
In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions, 5 NEUROETHICS 39 (2011). Sec-
ond: Is the formation and maintenance of a delusion best explained along the 
lines of the so-called two-factor model or the one-factor (prediction-error) model? 
Compare, e.g, Martin Davies et al., Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-
Factor Account, 8 PHIL., PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 133 (2002) (two-factor model), 
and Oren Griffiths et al., Delusions and Prediction Error: Re-Examining the Be-
havioural Evidence for Disrupted Error Signaling in Delusion Formation, 19 
COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY 439 (2014) (same), with Philip R. Corlett et al., To-
ward a Neurobiology of Delusions, 92 PROGRESS IN NEUROBIOLOGY 345 (2010) 
(one-factor theory based on prediction error). Third: Can the two models be rec-
onciled? Kengo Miyazono et al., Prediction-Error and Two-Factor Theories of De-
lusion Formation: Competitors or Allies?, in ABERRANT BELIEFS AND REASONING 
34 (Niall Galbraith ed., 2015). Fourth: Can the two-factor-model account for pol-
ythematic, as well as monothematic, delusions? See, e.g., Max Coltheart, On the 
Distinction Between Monothematic and Polythematic Delusions, 28 MIND & 
LANGUAGE 103, 110–11 (2013) (suggesting possible ways in which the two-factor 
theory can explain polythematic delusions). 
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the experience of his body moving but not being the author 
of its movement, he might entertain the proposition that he 
was—must have been—under the control or influence of 
some alien or external force. Moreover, having entertained 
the proposition that someone or something external to his 
real self has taken charge of what he does, he might come to 
believe it. Indeed, he might hold onto that belief no matter 
what the evidence to the contrary. He might, in other words, 
form and maintain what are known as delusions of alien 
control or influence. 
According to a 29-year-old shorthand typist diagnosed 
with schizophrenia: 
When I reach my hand for the comb it is my hand and arm which 
move, and my fingers pick up the pen, but I don’t control them. . . . 
I am just a puppet who is manipulated by cosmic strings. When the 
strings are pulled my body moves and I can’t prevent it.94 
In the mind of someone so afflicted, the metaphor of alien 
control will no longer be just a metaphor. It will become 
reality. Someone or something external to the real self has 
taken over: a demon, a device, God, and so forth. 
The sense of agency can be lost over the mind as well as 
the body.95 One might experience a thought in one’s head but 
have no experience of having put it there. The thought is 
instead experienced as having been inserted into one’s 
consciousness. This experience might in turn give rise to its 
own particular brand of delusion, commonly known as 
“thought insertion.”96 The actor comes to believe that 
 
 94. ANDREW C.P. SIMS, SYMPTOMS IN THE MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 153 (2d ed. 1995). 
 95. See, e.g., Joelle Proust, Is there a Sense of Agency for Thought?, in MENTAL 
ACTIONS 253 (Lucy O’Brien & Matthew Soteriou eds., 2009). 
 96. The literature on thought insertion, so far as one can tell, focuses on two 
questions. First: Does thought insertion involve a lost sense of agency or a lost 
sense of ownership? Compare G. LYNN STEPHENS & GEORGE GRAHAM, WHEN SELF-
CONSCIOUSNESS BREAKS: ALIEN VOICES AND INSERTED THOUGHTS (2000) (agency), 
and Patrizia Pedrini, Rescuing the “Loss-of-Agency” Account of Thought Insertion, 
22 PHIL., PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 221 (2016) (same), and Shaun Gallagher, 
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someone or something is putting thoughts in his head. 
According to another 29-year-old, also diagnosed with 
schizophrenia: 
I look out the window and think the garden looks nice and the grass 
cool, but the thoughts of Eamonn Andrews come into my mind. 
There are no other thoughts, only his . . . . He treats my mind like a 
screen and flashes his thoughts into it like you flash a picture.97 
One might likewise experience a voice in one’s head but 
have no experience of being its author. The actor loses his 
sense of agency over his own “inner speech,” attributing it to 
some external source or entity. This phenomenon too has a 
name: “auditory verbal hallucination.”98 Thought insertion 
 
Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought 
Insertion and Delusions of Control, 6 REV. PHIL. PSYCHOL. 865 (2015) (same), with 
Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome, A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the 
Analysis of Thought Insertion, 8 PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 205 (2009) 
(ownership), and Michelle Maiese, Thought Insertion as a Disownership 
Symptom, 14 PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 911 (2015) (same), and Jean-
Remy Martin & Eliszbeth Pacherie, Out of Nowwhere: Thought Insertion, 
Ownership and Context Integration, 22 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 111 (2013) 
(same). 
Second: Does the same mechanism that explains lost agency over action ex-
plain lost agency over thoughts? Compare, e.g., Philip Gerrans, The Feeling of 
Thinking: Sense of Agency in Delusions of Thought Insertion, 2 PSYCHOL. 
CONSCIOUSNESS: THEORY, RES., & PRAC. 291 (2015) (yes), with Agustin Vincete, 
The Comparator Account on Thought Insertion, Alien Voices and Inner Speech: 
Some Open Questions, 13 PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 335 (2014) (raising 
questions). 
 97. SIMS, supra note 94, at 152. 
 98. For a sampling of the literature on auditory verbal hallucinations, see 
STEPHENS & GRAHAM, supra note 96; Raymond Cho & Wayne Wu, Mechanisms of 
Auditory Verbal Hallucination in Schizophrenia, 4 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHIATRY 1 
(2013); Remko van Lutterveld et al., The Neurophysiology of Auditory 
Hallucinations—A Historical and Contemporary Review, 2 FRONTIERS IN 
PSYCHIATRY 1 (2011); Lauren Swiney & Paulo Sousa, A New Comparator Account 
of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations: How Motor Prediction Can Plausibly 
Contribute to the Sense of Agency for Inner Speech, 8 FRONTIERS IN HUM. 
NEUROSCI. 72 (2014); Rachel Upthegrove et al., Understanding Auditory Verbal 
Hallucinations: A Systematic Review of Current Evidence, 133 ACTA 
PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 352 (2016); Sam Wilkinson & Ben Alderson-Day, 
Voices and Thoughts in Psychosis: An Introduction, 7 REV. PHIL. & PSYCH. 529, 
531 (2016) (“[T]he orthodox view of AVHs [is that] they are to be understood as 
the result of disrupted monitoring of inner speech.”). For thoughts on how the law 
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and auditory verbal hallucinations can each be grounded in 
a lost sense of agency, not over the movements of one’s body, 
but over the movements of one’s mind. 
One form of auditory verbal hallucination, so-called 
command hallucinations, have attracted special attention 
from the law, at least when God is doing the commanding. 
According to the “deific decree” doctrine, if God tells you to 
kill, you’re insane.99 However the doctrine might relate to the 
traditional test,100 the fact that an accused heard the voice of 
God commanding him to commit the crime charged is some 
evidence that the real self wasn’t in charge. Hearing God’s 
command might mean the actor has come to see himself as 
an instrument of God’s hand, and seeing oneself as an 
instrument is one way to try to make sense of lost agency. Of 
course, insofar as the deific doctrine extends only to those 
who hear God’s voice, it sweeps too narrowly. It shouldn’t 
matter who’s doing the commanding. First Amendment 
worries aside,101 what matters is that the experience of being 
commanded is good evidence of what really matters: to wit, 
the experience of not being the agent of the acts adding up to 
 
can distinguish true from malingered auditory verbal hallucinations, see Simon 
McCarthy-Jones & Phillip J. Resnick, Listening to Voices: The Use of 
Phenomenology to Differentiate Malingered from Genuine Auditory Verbal 
Hallucinations, 37 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 183 (2014). 
 99. For a nice overview of the doctrine’s history, see Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 
F.3d 754, 784–87 (6th Cir. 2006) (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
 100. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 
25.04[C][1][a][iv], at 348 (7th ed. 2015) (discussing “deific decree” doctrine).  
 101. Wilson v. Gaetz, 608 F.3d 347, 354 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]o distinguish 
between ‘deific’ and all other delusions and confine the insanity defense to the 
former would present serious questions under the First Amendment[.]”) (Posner, 
J.); Grant H. Morris & Ansar Haroun, “God Told Me to Kill”: Religion or 
Delusion?, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 973, 992, 996 (2001). For commentary on the 
relationship between command hallucinations and violence, see, for example, 
Louise G. Braham et al., Acting on Command Hallucinations and Dangerous 
Behavior: A Critique of the Major Findings of the Last Decade, 24 CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. REV. 513, 522–26 (2004); Dale E. McNiel et al., The Relationship 
Between Command Hallucinations and Violence, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1288 
(2000); Abraham Rudnick, Relation Between Command Hallucinations and 
Dangerous Behavior, 27 J. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 253 (1999). 
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the crime. 
Of course, not all delusions are delusions of alien control 
and inserted thoughts. Delusions come in many shapes and 
sizes. Some are monothematic, involving “a single delusional 
belief or a small set of delusional beliefs that are all related 
to a single theme.”102 Others, of the variety typically seen in 
schizophrenia, for example, are polythematic, involving 
“delusional beliefs about a variety of topics unrelated to each 
other.” Some are downright bizarre.103 The real John Nash, 
for example, believed he would become the Emperor of 
Antarctica, not to mention being the left foot of God on 
Earth.104 Other delusions don’t reach such bizarre heights. 
Some are self-contained, leaving other beliefs untouched. 
Others metastasize, infecting the whole mind, such that 
other beliefs form around the delusion. Some of these beliefs 
are themselves delusional (secondary delusions); others 
seem like rational responses to the irrationality of the 
primary delusion. Delusions can compose a strange and 
motley crew. 
 
 102. Coltheart et al., Delusional Belief, supra note 93, at 280, 283–88. 
Monothematic delusions include the Capgras delusion, Cotard delusion, Fregoli 
delusion, mirrored-self misidentification, somatoparaphrenia, delusion of alien 
control, and delusion of thought insertion. 
 103. How might one explain the bizarre content of some delusions? According 
to one account: 
Bizarre delusions . . . represent inappropriate use of metaphor in an at-
tempt to establish some inter-subjective meaning, albeit futile. During 
the formative delusional mood, the world becomes ineffable. Prodromal 
patients use relative terms (similes) to describe their experiences: “It is 
as if people are actors, walking down the street wearing masks.” As these 
experiences persist, the relative terms subside (people are wearing 
masks, they are in disguise); the simile becomes a metaphor as the delu-
sion develops and the metaphor becomes a top-down prior around which 
perception and cognition are organized. 
Philip R. Corlett, Answering Some Phenomenal Challenges to the Prediction Error 
Model of Delusions, 14 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 181, 182 (2015). 
 104. See Donald Capps, John Nash’s Delusional Decade: A Case of Paranoid 
Schizophrenia, 52 PASTORAL PSYCHOL. 193, 200–01 (2004). The Nash character 
was also depicted as having visual hallucinations, but these are very rare. The 
real Nash’s hallucinations were only auditory. 
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Delusions of alien control and thought insertion reflect 
under-attribution of agency. When the actor ought to 
experience himself as agent, he doesn’t. Delusions can also 
reflect the opposite error: over-attribution. When the actor 
ought not to experience himself as an agent, he does. So-
called delusions of reference (or megalomania) are an 
example.105 Such delusions “involve beliefs that unrelated or 
commonplace phenomena in the world (events, objects, or 
other people) refer directly to oneself and carry a special 
personal significance.”106 The character John Nash in Ron 
Howard’s A Beautiful Mind suffered from delusions of 
reference, searching papers, magazines and whatnot, looking 
for secret messages and codes only he could decipher. 
Although delusions of alien control and delusions of 
reference might seem at opposite ends of the spectrum, 
delusions of reference, like delusions of alien control, might 
likewise originate in the experience of lost agency. 
The basic idea is simple. A lost sense of agency arises 
when the internal mechanism by which we gain a sense of 
agency fails to work as it should.107 Delusions of alien control 
arise when the actor tries to make sense of that experience, 
and some further defect prevents the actor from rejecting the 
hypothesis that some alien force is in control of his thoughts 
and actions.108 Another response, when one’s internal 
mechanism for self-monitoring fails, is to rely on external 
 
 105. For more on delusions of reference, see Mike Startup et al., Delusions of 
Reference: A New Theoretical Model, 14 COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY 110 (2009); 
Mike Startup & Sue Startup, On Two Kinds of Delusions of Reference, 137 
PSYCHIATRY RES. 87 (2005). 
 106. Coltheart et al., Delusional Belief, supra note 93, at 277. 
 107. See id. at 288. 
 108. This presupposes a so-called bottom-up account, according to which a 
delusion arises from an abnormal experience. So-called top-down accounts put 
the causal relation in the opposite direction, with abnormal experience arising 
from the delusion. One challenge top-down theories face, of course, is the need to 
explain where the delusion comes from in the first place. Bottom-up accounts 
claim that the abnormal experience, which gives rise to the delusion, is itself a 
result of some defect in how the brain works. See Bortolotti, Delusion, supra note 
93, § 3.2, at 19–21. 
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cues in an effort to compensate.109 These external cues then 
take on out-sized significance and meaning. They assume 
aberrant salience. In order to make sense of it all, the actor 
assigns them special and personal importance. Delusions of 
reference result: mundane objects “speak” to the actor, for 
example. 
Delusions of reference commonly go hand-in-hand with 
delusions of persecution.110 As with delusions of reference, 
the link between lost agency and persecutory delusions isn’t 
obvious or direct. Still, a link might well exist.111 For 
 
 109. ANANTHASWAMY, supra note 87, at 117 (noting that schizophrenic patients 
“have to rely more heavily on their judgments about the external environment to 
augment their sense of agency[,]” because their internal mechanism for self-
monitoring is defective); Bayne & Pacherie, supra note 78, at 486; Shitij Kapur, 
Psychosis as a State of Aberrant Salience: A Framework for Linking Biology, 
Phenomenology, and Pharmacology in Schizophrenia, 16 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 13, 
15 (2003); Synofzik et al., Experience of Agency, supra note 86, at 6 (“[A]s a 
consequence of giving up the usually most robust and reliable internal action 
information source, i.e., internal predictions, the sense of agency in psychotic 
patients is at constant risk of being misled by ad-hoc events, invading beliefs, and 
confusing emotions and evaluations.”); Matthis Synofzik et al., Misattributions of 
Agency in Schizophrenia Are Based on Imprecise Predictions About the Sensory 
Consequences of One’s Actions, 133 BRAIN 262, 270 (2010) (Schizophrenic 
“patients might over-attribute external events to their own agency whenever 
stronger weighted external agency cues are in fact not veridical and 
misleading.”); Martin Voss et al., Altered Awareness of Action in Schizophrenia: 
A Specific Deficit in Predicting Action Consequences, 133 BRAIN 3104, 3110 
(2010). 
 110. DANIEL FREEMAN & PHILIPPA GARETY, PARANOIA: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PERSECUTORY DELUSIONS 122 (2004) (“Internal sensations of significance and 
reference may lead to delusions of reference that are understood within a 
persecutory belief system.”); Coltheart et al., Delusional Belief, supra note 93, at 
277 (“Delusions of persecution and reference commonly co-occur (often along with 
hallucinations).”); Startup & Startup, supra note 105, at 112 (“[I]t appears that 
the traditional association between referential delusions and persecutory 
delusions applies primarily to referential delusions of observation, [not 
communication.]”). 
 111. FREEMAN & GARETY, supra note 110, at 117 (developing a model of 
persecutory delusion in which “[i]nternal anomalous experiences are important,” 
including “thoughts being experienced as voices; actions being experienced as 
unintended; more subtle cognitive alternations such as perceptual anomalies; 
depersonalization; or a sense of significance or reference”); Daniel Freeman & 
Philippa Garety, Advances in Understanding and Treating Persecutory 
Delusions: A Review, 49 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 1179, 
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example, when an actor loses a sense of agency over his 
thoughts and inner speech, let alone his body, anxiety is a 
natural response. He might come to believe that the thoughts 
he experiences, and the words he hears in his head, aren’t 
just external: they might be part of a malevolent 
conspiracy.112 Compared to seeing oneself as someone’s or 
something’s puppet, it might be easier to see oneself as the 
object of persecution.113 Persecutory delusions typically draw 
content from the actor’s pre-existing stock of beliefs.114 
M’Naghten’s belief that the Tories were after him may, for 
example, have been rooted in what, according one author, 
was his “hatred of the Tories and the policies they 
represented.”115 
We’ve come a long way. We started with the experience 
of lost-agency, and delusions of alien control and thought 
insertion to which that experience can give rise. Those aren’t 
uncommon delusions to find in cases where the defendant 
looks like an exemplar of insanity. Other delusions, also not 
uncommon in folks who look, at least intuitively, like they’re 
 
1182 (2014); Daniel Freeman, Suspicious Minds: The Psychology of Persecutory 
Delusions, 27 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 425, 432 (2007); Robyn Langdon et al., The 
Cognitive Neuropsychological Understanding of Persecutory Delusions, in 
PERSECUTORY DELUSIONS: ASSESSMENT, THEORY, AND TREATMENT 221, 229 (Daniel 
Freeman et al., 2008) (“[N]europsychological impairments . . . might precipitate 
a train of thought leading (more or less directly) to a persecutory delusion.”); 
Jennifer Radden, Defining Persecutory Paranoia, in RECONCEIVING 
SCHIZOPHRENIA 255 (Man Cheung Chun et al. eds., 2007). 
 112. See, e.g., Paul C. Fletcher & Chris D. Frith, Perceiving is Believing: A 
Bayesian Approach to Explaining the Positive Symptoms of Schizophrenia, 10 
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 48, 56 (2009) (“Ultimately, someone with 
schizophrenia will need to develop a set of beliefs that must account for a great 
deal of strange and sometimes contradictory data. Very commonly they come to 
believe that they are being persecuted: delusions of persecution are one of the 
most striking and common of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia . . .”). 
 113. FREEMAN & GARETY, supra note 110, at 120 (“Believing that something is 
wrong with them (for instance, that they are becoming mad) may be a more 
distressing belief (and less plausible and compelling) than that they are being 
persecuted.”). 
 114. Id. at 119 (“In the search for meaning, pre-existing beliefs about the self, 
others, and the world will be drawn upon.”). 
 115. MORAN, supra note 1, at 45. 
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insane, such as delusions of reference and persecution, can 
likewise arise from lost-agency, or so it seems. If so, then 
insanity doesn’t always come with a demon within. Lost 
agency can manifest in delusions the alien-self metaphor 
fails to capture. Nonetheless, even in these cases, the real 
self isn’t at the controls. Alien self or not, what matters in 
the end is the lost sense of agency—of not being in control, of 
being a passive onlooker—not the content of the particular 
delusions, if any, it generates. 
Not all delusions, we should emphasize, spring from the 
experience of lost agency. Some delusions are rooted in other 
abnormal experiences. For example, someone with Capgras 
delusion recognizes a familiar face, but doesn’t experience 
the affective reactions that usually go along with it. That 
missing affective experience, together with some further 
defect in the way the actor tests hypotheses, produces a 
delusion: the person with the familiar face (one’s mother, for 
example) must really be a robot or an imposter.116 When 
someone commits a crime in the grip of delusion, red flags 
should go up. With delusion comes at least the possibility, 
and sometimes probability, that the real self wasn’t the self 
in charge at the time of the crime. Delusion or no, if the 
choice to commit a crime was made when the sense of agency 
was gone, the real culprit wasn’t the real self. Whether or not 
the actor delusionally believed an alien self was in command, 
the real self wasn’t. 
The traditional test portrays insanity as consisting in a 
 
 116. See, e.g., Neralie Wise, The Capgras Delusion: An Integrated Approach, 15 
PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 183 (2016) (offering an account of the Capgras 
delusion that draws on what the author calls the phenomenological and analytic 
traditions). The Cotard delusion is the belief that one is dead, or that parts of 
one’s body are rotting. “[T]he experiential states underlying the Capgras and 
Cotard delusions are different: whereas the Capgras delusion appears to involve 
a fairly focal impairment in face processing, the Cotard delusion seems to involve 
a global alteration in affective experience. Rather than experiencing only familiar 
faces as alien, the Cotard patient experiences everything as strange, devoid of 
meaning and lifeless.” Tim Bayne, Delusions, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
CONSCIOUSNESS 218, 220 (Tim Bayne et al. eds., 2009). 
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traditional excusing condition, i.e., compelled ignorance or 
choice, provided it results from a “mental disease or defect” 
(left undefined). The irrationality theory, in each of its forms, 
portrays insanity as consisting, more or less, in one 
particular feature characteristic of different mental 
disorders, namely, psychosis (i.e., delusions and 
hallucinations).117 In contrast, the aptly-named lost-agency 
theory portrays insanity as consisting in the loss of one’s 
sense of agency. Delusions and hallucinations are a common 
upshot of lost agency, but they’re not coextensive with it. If 
responsibility presupposes agency, and if agency 
presupposes a sense of agency, then the insane, lacking a 
sense of agency, aren’t responsible. 
Schizophrenia is probably first among equals when it 
comes to the mental disorders most commonly associated 
with insanity. On the lost-agency theory, that comes as no 
surprise, for the “delusion of alien control is particularly 
associated with schizophrenia.”118 Indeed, lost agency 
appears capable of underwriting a number of delusions 
characteristic of schizophrenia.119 Yet not everyone we might 
intuitively regard as insane is schizophrenic, or at least we 
shouldn’t assume that to be true. What, for example, about 
those afflicted with manias, philias and phobias, i.e., 
 
 117. The unintelligibility variant equates insanity with severe psychosis. The 
delusion variant equates it with psychosis of whatever severity, provided the 
crime the accused committed wouldn’t have been a crime had the actor’s 
delusions been real. 
 118. Coltheart et al., Delusional Belief, supra note 93, at 288; id. at 278 
(“[C]ontrol delusions . . . are considered to be more specifically characteristic of 
schizophrenia.”). 
 119. FRITH & JOHNSTONE, supra note 68, at 141 (“Many of the delusions 
reported by patients with schizophrenia seem to result from a combination of an 
abnormal experience with a willingness to develop extremely unlikely 
explanations for that experience.”); JOELLE PROUST, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
METACOGNITION: MENTAL AGENCY AND SELF-AWARENESS 243–64 (2013) 
(discussing sense of agency in schizophrenia); Philip Gerrans, Passivity 
Experience in Schizophrenia, in DISTURBED CONSCIOUSNESS: NEW ESSAYS ON 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 325 (Rocco J. Gennaro ed., 
2015). 
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disorders whose stock-in-trade is intense, unremitting, and 
unwanted desire? When an actor commits a crime in the grip 
of a desire associated with these disorders, who commits the 
crime? An alien self or the real self? 
If we attend to the way those suffering from such 
afflictions sometimes describe their experiences, it might be 
tempting to believe, for example, that the kleptomaniac 
didn’t choose to set the fire, because his desire to set it 
bypassed his will.120 What, though, could that possibly mean? 
How can desires move the body without the will’s help? When 
the doctor taps your patellar ligament your knee goes up 
without your will, but desires don’t move the body the way 
reflexes do. Desires cause intentions; intentions cause 
volitions; and volitions cause the body to move. That’s how 
desires move bodies. Desires don’t move bodies all by 
themselves. They require the will to form intentions and 
volitions in their service, since volitions are in the end what 
make the body move, at least when its motion isn’t due to 
mechanical reflex. If so, then the idea of desires bypassing 
the will is incoherent, or at best metaphorical. 
Any sense of alienation involved in disorders of desire is 
probably, at least in most cases, an alienation of a more 
common and pedestrian kind, compared to the lost sense of 
agency necessary for insanity. Rather than the alienation of 
lost agency, disorders of desire more likely reflect the 
alienation arising from desires we wish we didn’t have. Still, 
we can’t completely eliminate the possibility that the 
metaphor of the bypassed will isn’t, at least sometimes, more 
than just a metaphor.121 Sometimes, perhaps, an actor might 
 
 120. Moore, Neuroscience, supra note 36, at 195–97 (discussing the idea of 
desires “bypassing” the will). When Joel Feinberg talks about the desires 
associated with kleptomania he describes them as “‘senseless’ . . . because they 
do not cohere, are likely to seem alien, not fully expressive of their owner’s 
essential character. When a person acts to satisfy them, it is as if he were acting 
on somebody else’s desires.” FEINBERG, supra note 47, at 288 (emphasis added). 
 121. Bayne & Levy, supra note 81, at 52 (“It is sometimes suggested that one 
of the pathological features of the phenomenology of addiction and obsessive-
compulsive spectrum disorders is that the individuals concerned experience their 
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not experience the relevant desire as his desire, nor the 
intention arising from that desire as his intention, nor the 
volition arising from that intention as his volition. If so, then 
talk of bypassed wills becomes another way of saying the 
actor’s sense of agency was lost.122 
B. Defects of Consciousness 
The traditional test of insanity invites us to see insanity 
as a defect of reason (cognition) or will (volition). The lost-
agency theory puts insanity in a different light. It’s neither 
(just) a defect of reason, nor will. Instead, it’s a defect of 
consciousness: a lost sense of agency. So understood, insanity 
doesn’t stand alone. It belongs in the same camp as other 
defects of consciousness. Three such defects have captured 
the criminal law’s imagination: hypnosis, somnambulism 
(sleepwalking), and multiple personality disorder (now 
known as dissociative personality disorder).123 These 
phenomena are the exotica of the criminal law: interesting to 
think about but rarely seen in the wild of the real world. 
Criminal lawyers usually see them as belonging to one 
species, and insanity as an entirely different animal. The 
 
actions as caused by their desires and urges rather than as having their source 
in them. We suspect that as one begins to experience one’s movements as caused 
by one’s mental states, one no longer experiences them as one’s own actions.”). 
 122. What about psychopaths? Are they insane under the lost-agency theory? 
Students of the criminal law, along with ethicists, have spent a lot of time 
wondering if psychopaths are capable of bearing moral responsibility for the 
crimes they commit. The idea is that if they can’t be morally responsible, then 
they can’t be criminally responsible either. One couldn’t possibly do justice here 
to the enormous literature dealing with psychopaths and psychopathy. See, e.g., 
BEING AMORAL: PSYCHOPATHY AND MORAL INCAPACITY (Thomas Schramme ed., 
2014); HANDBOOK ON PSYCHOPATHY AND LAW (Kent A. Kiehl & Walter P. Sinnott-
Armstrong eds., 2013); RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHOPATHY: INTERFACING LAW, 
PSYCHIATRY, AND PHILOSOPHY (Luca Malatesti & John McMillan eds., 2010). 
Suffice it to say that, so far as one can tell, psychopathy doesn’t appear to involve 
any claim of lost agency. 
 123. Epileptic fugue, associated with petit mal seizures, is another example. 
For a fascinating discussion of such cases in nineteenth century England, see 
JOEL PETER EIGEN, UNCONSCIOUS CRIME: MENTAL ABSENCE AND CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY IN VICTORIAN LONDON (2003). 
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lost-agency theory suggests we should instead see them as 
members of the same species, belonging in the same 
doctrinal camp. 
1. Hypnosis 
In Robert Wiene’s 1920 film The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, 
hypnotism leads a character named Cesare (under the 
control of Dr. Caligari) to commit a string of murders.124 In 
the 1959 novel The Manchurian Candidate, post-hypnotic 
suggestion leads Raymond Shaw to attempted assassination. 
That’s film and fiction.125 Not the real world. Hypnosis today 
is more about stage entertainment and smoking cessation. 
One searches in vain for real crimes committed under 
hypnosis.126 Maybe that’s because hypnosis can push a 
person only so far: no one will do under hypnosis something 
he wouldn’t do on his own.127 Still, the prospect of hypnotic 
 
 124. See, e.g., Bernard Williams, The Actus Reus of Dr. Caligari, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1661, 1670 (1994). 
 125. STEFAN ANDRIOPOULOS, POSSESSED: HYPNOTIC CRIMES, CORPORATE 
FICTION, AND THE INVENTION OF CINEMA (2008); Deirdre Barrett, Hypnosis in Film 
and Television, 49 AM. J. CLIN. HYPNOSIS 13 (2006). 
 126. See Michael Heap, Hypnosis in the Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
HYPNOSIS 745–66 (Michael R. Nash & Amanda J. Barnier eds., 2008); Graham F. 
Wagstaff, Hypnosis and the Law: Examining the Stereotypes, 35 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 1277, 1279 (2008). Newspapers, including the New York Times, reported 
in 1895 that Thomas McDonald, acquitted of murder, had claimed at trial to have 
been under the hypnotic control of Anderson Gray. See, e.g., The Hypnotist Made 
Principal: His Subject Found Guiltless of Murder by a Kansas Court While He 
Bears the Penalty for the Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1895. Just a few days later, 
however, the Times ran another story, reporting “that the defense of hypnotism 
was not raised at the trial; that no evidence concerning hypnotism was given, and 
that the word ‘hypnotism’ was mentioned but once, in a remark of McDonald’s 
counsel, after Gray, the first man tried, had been convicted.” Hypnotism Not a 
Factor: Gray Made McDonald a Murderer Merely by Argument, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
15, 1895. In any event, McDonald was acquitted, apparently on grounds of self-
defense. See id. Gray was convicted and hung. See State v. Gray, 39 P. 1050, 1054 
(Kan. 1895) (affirming conviction). 
 127. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.01 cmt. 2 at 221 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1985) (“The widely held view that the hypnotized subject will not follow 
suggestions repugnant to him was deemed insufficient to warrant treating his 
conduct while hypnotized as voluntary; his dependency and helplessness are too 
pronounced.”). 
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crime has become, for whatever reason, part of the legal 
imagination. 
The experts disagree about what really happens when 
someone enters a hypnotic trance.128 According to one school 
of thought, what happens isn’t much. Hypnotized subjects 
just get more relaxed and willing to follow orders. They play-
act. If so, if nothing special happens when someone is 
hypnotized, then a hypnotic crime is no different than any 
other crime, and neither are the culprits who commit them. 
The other school makes hypnosis more interesting. Hypnosis 
is a dissociated state in which the hypnotist takes control of 
the subject’s mind and actions.129 The subject becomes 
“mesmerized.”130 If so, then hypnotic crimes aren’t just like 
the rest. Hypnotized villains are innocent pawns. Their 
manipulators bear all the guilt. 
Go back to the metaphor of the alien self. If we take the 
dissociation account as true, the family resemblance between 
hypnotism and insanity becomes easy to see. The insane and 
the hypnotized both experience a lost sense of agency. 
Indeed, what hypnotists call the “classic suggestion effect” 
just is a lost sense of agency.131 This lost sense of agency 
 
 128. Compare Erik Z. Woody & Pamela Sadler, Dissociation Theories of 
Hypnosis, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HYPNOSIS: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND 
PRACTICE 81 (Michael R. Nash & Amanda J. Barnier eds., 2008) (discussing state 
theories), with Steven Jay Lynn et al., Social Cognitive Theories of Hypnosis, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HYPNOSIS: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 111 
(Michael R. Nash & Amanda J. Barnier eds., 2008) (discussing non-state 
theories). 
 129. Vince Polito et al., Sense of Agency Across Contexts: Insights from 
Schizophrenia and Hypnosis, 2 PSYCHOL. OF CONSCIOUSNESS: THEORY, RES., & 
PRAC. 301, 309–10 (2015) (“[T]he ‘dissociated control’ and ‘dissociated experience’ 
theories of hypnotic responding are conceptually very similar to the comparator 
model account of passivity experiences in schizophrenia.”). 
 130. So named after Franz Anton Mesmer. See ALAN GAULD, A HISTORY OF 
HYPNOTISM (1992). 
 131. David A. Oakley & Peter W. Halligan, Hypnotic Suggestion: Opportunities 
for Cognitive Neuroscience, 14 NATURE REVS.: NEUROSCIENCE 565, 568 (2013) 
(“[A]n effect is considered a ‘classical suggestion-effect’ only if it is experienced as 
involuntary; as ‘happening all by itself.’”); Vince Polito et al., Measuring Agency 
Change Across the Domain of Hypnosis, 1 PSYCHOL. OF CONSCIOUSNESS: THEORY, 
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divides the self. The real self becomes disassociated from the 
alien self, and the alien self takes control.132 The hypnotized 
real self, like the insane real self, becomes a passive observer 
to what his mind and body do under the alien self’s control. 
Indeed, those under hypnosis sometimes attribute what they 
do to alien control, just like the insane sometimes do.133 
Still, the phenomenology of hypnosis differs from 
insanity in at least three ways. First, the loss of agency in 
insanity is associated with mental disease or defect; the loss 
of agency in hypnosis is associated with, because it results 
from, hypnotic induction. Second, the alien self of insanity 
controls the real self, but no one in turn controls the alien 
self, whereas the alien self of hypnosis is under the 
hypnotist’s control. The hypnotist is the puppeteer, and the 
alien self the puppet. The real self is a helpless bystander.134 
Finally, when the actor is told to snap out of it, the lost sense 
of agency ends, the alien self disappears, and the self re-
integrates. Reintegration doesn’t come about so easily for the 
insane. 
Again, hypnotic crimes, or at least alleged hypnotic 
 
RES., & PRAC. 3, 3 (2014) (“[E]xperiencing . . . actions in hypnosis as occurring 
without effort or conscious volition. . . . has been considered an essential element 
of hypnotic responding.”). 
 132. See Woody & Sadler, supra note 128, at 89 (“[A]cross [the] diverse matrix 
of hypnotic behavior there is an essential denominator: in hypnosis all these 
behaviors are accompanied by the subjective experience that the self is not the 
origin of the response.”); id. at 92 (suggesting that the dissociation arising from 
hypnosis involves a “breakdown” in the same mechanism that produces a loss of 
the sense of agency in “psychotic disorders, such as schizophrenia.”); id. at 94 
(“[D]issociation theories [of hypnosis] hypothesize that for highly hypnotizable 
people, hypnosis transiently brings about a disruption of [the] mechanism . . . for 
discriminating the internal versus external origins of events.”). 
 133. Michael H. Connors, Hypnosis and Belief: A Review of Hypnotic Delusions, 
36 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 27, 37–38 (2015); Rochelle E. Cox et al., An 
Hypnotic Analogue of Alien Control: Modeling the Delusion and Testing Its 
Impact on Behavior and Self Monitoring, 1 PSYCHOL. OF CONSCIOUSNESS: THEORY, 
RES., & PRAC. 407, 425 (2014). 
 134. Hypnotic actions are at the crossroads between lost agency and 
manipulation, i.e., the hypnotist induces a lost sense of agency and manipulates 
the actions of the emergent alien self. 
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crimes, are, at best, offbeat events. If and when they ever 
occur, most students of the criminal law, at least inasmuch 
as the dissociation theory accurately depicts the hypnotic 
subject’s state of mind, would agree that criminal liability 
would be out of bounds. The disagreement is why. According 
to some, the actor hasn’t acted. He hasn’t voluntarily moved 
his body. Others find this implausible. How can it be that the 
actor hasn’t acted when his body performed whatever 
complex action it takes to commit the crime? Volitions must 
have formed, which means the resulting movements were 
voluntary. If so, the reason for letting the hypnotic criminal 
go must be something other than the alleged fact that he 
didn’t act. 
Both sides have a point. Indeed, they might be talking 
past one another. The no-act camp looks at the real self, 
rightly observing that the real self didn’t act. The real self 
was just a bystander, albeit a bystander to the voluntary 
movement of his own body.135 The act camp looks at the alien 
self, rightly observing that the alien self did act, albeit at the 
hypnotist’s behest. Mainly at stake in this dispute is the 
burden of proof. If the no-act camp wins, the state bears the 
burden. If the act camp wins, the defense bears it. Yet rather 
than make the burden question turn on who you look at—
real self or alien self—the burden question should be 
answered directly. Are the reasons for assigning the burden 
to one side or the other better served if the state must prove 
the accused was in command, or if the defense must prove he 
wasn’t? 
2. Sleepwalking 
Unlike hypnotic crimes, which exist only in fiction, 
people do actually commit crimes while asleep.136 Mrs. 
 
 135. See Tim Bayne, The Sense of Agency, in THE SENSES: CLASSIC AND 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 368 (Fiona Macpherson ed., 2014) (“Many people 
are reluctant to regard physical or mental happenings that are unaccompanied 
by a basic ‘experience of doing’ as actions.”). 
 136. Sleepwalking is caused by partial arousal from stage 3–4 NREM sleep. 
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Cogdon laid out her 19-year-old daughter Pat’s pajamas, put 
a hot-water bottle in her bed, and a glass of milk on her 
bedstand.137 Then she went to bed. She later “left her bed, 
fetched an axe from the woodheap . . . and struck two 
accurate forceful blows on [Pat’s] head with the blade of the 
axe, thus killing her.”138 The year was 1950. The place was 
Australia, and the Korean War was waging not far away. 
Mrs. Cogdon had told Pat her worries about the war before 
going to sleep. When she awoke after the killing, Mrs. 
Cogdon reported having “dreamt that ‘the war was all 
around the house,’ that soldiers were in Pat’s room, and that 
one soldier was on the bed attacking Pat.”139 She recalled 
nothing else. Tried for murder, she was acquitted. 
Then there was Ken Parks. Parks had a gambling 
problem, which had strained his marriage. He got no sleep 
on May 22, 1987. On the following day he went to sleep 
around 1:30 a.m. with much on his mind. The next thing 
Parks remembered was “looking down at his mother-in-law’s 
face. Her mouth and eyes were open and she had a 
 
Sleepwalking “episodes typically take place during the first third of the night 
when slow-wave [or deep] sleep is predominant.” Antonio Zadra et al., 
Somnambulism: Clinical Aspects and Pathophysiological Hypotheses, 12 THE 
LANCET: NEUROLOGY 285, 285 (2013). “Sleepwalking” or “somnabulism” is 
distinguished from what’s called “RBD,” for “REM Sleep Behavior Disorder. See 
Naoko Tachibana, REM Sleep Behavior Disorder, 6 SLEEP MED. CLINICS 459, 459 
(2011). RBD is a “unique parasomnia characterized by dream enactment behavior 
during REM sleep.” Ronald B. Postuma et al., REM Sleep Behavior Disorder: 
From Dreams to Neurodegeneration, 46 NEUROBIOLOGY OF DISEASE 553, 553 
(2012). Cases involving sleepwalking can also involve the use of sleep aids, or 
alcohol. See Christopher Daley et al., “I Did What?” Zolpidem and the Courts, 39 
J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 535, 535 (2011); Shreeya Popat & William Winslade, 
While You Were Sleeping: Science and Neurobiology of Sleep Disorders and the 
Enigma of Legal Responsibility of Violence During Parasomnia, 8 NEUROETHICS 
203, 207–09 (2015). 
 137. See Norval Morris, Somnamulistic Homicide: Ghosts, Spiders, and North 
Koreans, 5 RES JUDICATAE 29, 29 (1951). Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183, 183–
85 (Ct. App. 1879), is also frequently cited. 
 138. Morris, supra note 137, at 30. 
 139. Id. 
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‘frightened “help-me” look.’”140 After falling asleep, Parks 
had driven from his home to that of his in-law’s, fourteen 
miles away. He stabbed his mother-in-law to death, and 
strangled his father-in-law unconscious. He then got back 
into his car and drove to a police station. He remembered bits 
and pieces of what happened, but only bits and pieces. The 
jury acquitted Parks, believing he was indeed asleep 
throughout it all.141 
Sleepwalking, like hypnosis, is a state of altered or 
impaired consciousness.142 The alien-self metaphor can once 
again help explain what happens, and why sleepwalkers, like 
the hypnotized, are kin to the insane. The consciousness of 
the insane and the somnambulist are altered insofar as the 
sense of agency is lost in both. Neither experiences himself 
as the author of what he does, and when agency is lost, the 
alien self is born. The real (waking) self becomes dissociated 
from the alien (sleeping) self.143 The alien self takes charge, 
and the real self becomes a passive bystander. The alien self 
may be acting out a dream, or something like a dream.144 The 
 
 140. Roger Broughton et al., Homicidal Somnabulism: A Case Report, 17 SLEEP 
253, 255 (1994) (detailed discussion of Parks case); Kenneth J. Weiss et al., 
Parasomnias, Violence, and the Law, 39 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 249 (2011). 
 141. R. v. Parks, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 871, 880 (Can.). 
 142. See Zadra et al., supra note 136, at 285 (“Somnambulism is defined as a 
series of complex behaviours that are usually initiated during arousals from slow-
wave sleep and culminate in walking around with an altered state of 
consciousness and impaired judgment.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 143. Dev Banerjee & Angus Nisbet, Sleepwalking, 6 SLEEP MED. CLINICS 401, 
410 (2011) (“[S]leepwalking and other non-REM parasomnias might arise from a 
dissociation of sleep and wakefulness occurring across different brain 
regions . . . .”); Mark W. Mahowald et al., State Dissociation: Implications for 
Sleep and Wakefulness, Consciousness, and Culpability, 6 SLEEP MED. CLINICS 
393, 395–96 (2011) (“Disorders of arousal are the most impressive and most 
frequent of the NREM sleep-state dissociation/admixture phenomena . . . . 
Disorders of arousal simply represent the simultaneous occurrence of 
[wakefulness] and NREM sleep.”). 
 144. See, e.g., Delphine Oudiette et al., Dreamlike Mentations During 
Sleepwalking and Sleep Terrors in Adults, 32 SLEEP 1621, 1626 (2009) 
(“[D]reamlike mentations (mostly brief, frightening visual images) may 
occasionally exist during sleepwalking and sleep terrors, suggesting that a 
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alien self of sleepwalking isn’t usually dangerous. Usually, 
but not always. Sometimes something happens that 
precipitates a crime.145 Sleep crimes tend to be violent, but 
when awake, the sleepwalkers who commit them tend not to 
be. 
Again, sleepwalkers aren’t exactly like the insane. First, 
the loss of agency in sleepwalking is associated with the 
psychology of sleep, not mental disease or defect. Second, 
unlike the hypnotized subject and the insane, the 
somnambulist may not be able to report what happened. 
Perhaps he doesn’t remember, or perhaps he never forms 
memories about what happened in the first place. Still, 
sometimes the real self appears to get glimpses of what 
happened, and can recall bits and pieces,146 as did Parks 
when he recalled the look on his mother-in-law’s face. 
Finally, when the actor wakes up, the lost sense of agency 
ends, the alien self disappears, and the self re-integrates. It 
takes more for the insane to reintegrate than waking up.147 
 
complex mental activity takes place during SWS. Sleepwalking may thus 
represent acting out of the corresponding dreamlike mentations.”); Zadra et al., 
supra note 136, at 288 (“[E]mpirical evidence suggests that sleep mentation is 
not only frequently part of the main experience of somnambulism, but also can 
modulate motor behavior during an episode. . . . Furthermore, the mentation 
reported by patients was congruent with recorded nocturnal behavior, suggesting 
that sleepwalking might be the acting out of dreamlike mentations.”). 
 145. Weiss et al., supra note 140, at 280 (“It appears that violent behavior can 
occur when NREM sleep is interrupted, during somnabulistic episodes, upon 
incomplete arousal from sleep.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Mark R. Pressman, Sleepwalking, Amnesia, Comorbid 
Conditions and Triggers: Effects of Recall and Other Methodological Biases, 36 
SLEEP 1757, 1757 (2013) (noting that “recent reports of dream-like mentation 
associated with sleepwalking episodes and even the incorporation of elements of 
perceptual environment and behavior have suggested that amnesia for at least 
some patients and some episodes is not as complete as has been previously 
accepted”); Zadra et al., supra note 136, at 288 (“[M]any patients can and do recall 
at least portions of episodes upon awakening, and thus [data] suggest[s] that 
complete amnesia is not standard for adult sleepwalkers.”). 
 147. Sleepwalking cases raise the same doctrinal question as do hypnosis 
cases: Is the accused not guilty because he didn’t act, or because he acted but isn’t 
responsible for some other reason? See infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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3. Multiple Personality 
In the popular imagination, the portrait of multiple 
personality disorder (now officially called dissociative 
identity disorder, or DID) is the character Sybil, who was 
alleged to have had sixteen different personalities or 
personality states.148 Sybil didn’t commit any crimes, nor did 
any of her personalities. Some multiples do. Take Bridget 
Denny-Shaffer. Denny-Shaffer was a delivery nurse at 
Rehoboth Hospital in Gallup, New Mexico.149 On May 10, 
1991, she went to the Memorial General Hospital in Las 
Cruces, and identified herself as Linda, a medical student 
from the University of New Mexico, who was doing a 
pediatric rotation.150 She then took one of the babies in the 
Hospital’s nursery, and headed for Texas.151 Charged with 
kidnapping, Denny-Shaffer, who was diagnosed with 
multiple personality disorder (MPD), argued that she never 
kidnapped anyone.152 Linda did.153 
When we talk about multiple personality disorder we 
need to be careful. What exactly is going on? One theory, at 
 
 148. The character Sybil was based on Shirley Ardell Mason, who probably 
didn’t actually suffer from MPD. See DEBBIE NATHAN, SYBIL EXPOSED: THE 
EXTRAORDINARY STORY BEHIND THE FAMOUS MULTIPLE PERSONALITY CASE (2011). 
An “alter” is thought to emerge in response to a particular emotional episode, 
which the alter can deal with better than the host. MPD is thought to arise as a 
reaction to trauma: the self splits in order to manage a traumatic event. 
 149. United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1002 (10th Cir. 1993).  
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. at 1010. 
 153. See id. at 1002. The story is actually more complicated. Everyone agreed 
the accused’s host personality, named “Gidget,” wasn’t in charge at the time of 
the kidnaping; one of the alters, either “Rina” or “Bridget,” was. Anyhow, whoever 
was in charge at the time must have lied when she identified herself to the staff 
at the Memorial General Hospital in Las Cruces as “Linda.” Appellate opinions 
addressing the criminal liability of defendants diagnosed with MPD are rare. The 
reported cases include Kirkland v. State, 304 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); 
Commonwealth v. Roman, 606 N.E.2d 1333 (Mass. 1993); State v. Grimsley, 444 
N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). 
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least compared to the next, is metaphysically extravagant.154 
Assuming a simple case of MPD, with one “alter” and one 
“host,” this extravagant account tells us we have two 
different people occupying the same body seriatim over time. 
If so, what should happen when, in a case like Denny-Shafer, 
the alter was in charge at the time of the crime? What should 
the verdict be? Guilty or not? 
Two possibilities pop out. One would be to judge the mind 
of the alter. After all, the alter was the one in charge at the 
time of the crime. If she satisfies the elements of the crime 
charged and has no defense, then the verdict should be 
guilty. Of course, that would mean the host goes to jail too. 
Yet the host was (on this story) innocent, assuming she 
wasn’t complicit in the alter’s crime. That doesn’t seem fair. 
Another possibility would be to judge the mind of the host 
(even though the alter was in charge at the time). If the host 
wasn’t complicit, then the verdict should be not guilty, 
though that would mean the guilty alter goes free too, 
assuming of course that the alter had no defense of his own. 
That doesn’t seem fair either. The metaphysically 
extravagant account, besides being extravagant, throws up 
some hard choices. 
The second theory of MPD avoids these conundrums, 
because it doesn’t rely on the unlikely metaphysics of the 
first. It doesn’t hypothesize two different people in the same 
body. Instead, it supposes that multiple personality disorder 
involves one body and one person.155 What gets multiplied 
 
 154. See, e.g., ELYN R. SAKS, JEKYLL ON TRIAL 42–51 (1997) (describing 
metaphysically extravagant theory); Elyn R. Saks, Multiple Personality Disorder 
and Criminal Responsibility, 10 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 185, 189–90 (2001) 
(same). 
 155. See Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews, Delusion, Dissociation and 
Identity, 6 PHIL. EXPLORATIONS 31, 33 (2003) (“[E]ach of the symptoms in the 
modern cases [of MPD] may be assimilated to other well recognized psychiatric 
conditions. . . . [W]hat we have [in cases of MPD] are single persons with a serious 
mental illness which, like other serious mental illnesses, impairs the 
development and exercise of unified autonomous agency.”); id. at 34 (“The 
evidence suggests . . . that alter personalities are mere person-fragments, and not 
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isn’t the number of people in the body, but the number of 
selves in the person. When it comes to bodies and persons, 
the rule is “one to a customer.”156 One body, one person. Your 
person can handle multiple selves but your body can manage 
only one person per lifetime. For present purposes, let’s use 
Occam’s razor and eliminate unnecessary persons. Let’s 
assume, therefore, that the second theory is right. Multiple 
personalities are really one person with multiple selves.157 
The alien-self metaphor can help shed light on how MPD 
works according to the second account. In MPD-speak, the 
alter is the alien self, and the host is the real self. When the 
real self (host) loses its sense of agency,158 the alien self 
(alter) emerges and takes control. The real self continues to 
experience a sense of ownership. He continues to recognize 
the body the alter is occupying as his body, but he loses any 
sense of agency over it.159 Agency and control are instead 
 
in the sense of being short-lived fully-fledged persons, but in the sense that alters 
are one-dimensional and lacking in character development.”); Robert F. Schopp, 
Multiple Personality Disorder, Accountable Agency, and Criminal Acts, 10 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 297, 298 (2001) (“[T]o the extent that DID exculpates criminal 
defendants, it does so for the same reasons that support the exculpatory 
significance of impaired consciousness more generally.”) 
 156. DANIEL DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 422 (1991). 
 157. The shift in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
from “Multiple Personality Disorder” to “Dissociative Identity Disorder” reflects 
the shift in the psychiatric profession from the first theory to the second. As one 
of the psychiatrists behind the change put it: “Multiple personality carries with 
it the implication that [those with the disorder] really have more than one 
identity, . . . [but the real] problem is fragmentation of identity.” Clyde 
Haberman, Debate Persists Over Diagnosing Mental Health Disorders, Long After 
“Sybil,” N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2014 (quoting Stanford psychiatrist David Spiegel). 
 158. See Kennett & Matthews, supra note 155, at 37–38 (noting that the 
experience of “depersonalization” is common to dissociative disorders and that 
depersonalization involves a “loss of feelings of agency”). Those who suffer from 
“depersonalization disorder” experience lost agency, but don’t go onto form the 
delusions associated with MPD. 
 159. See id. at 33 (“[T]here is co-consciousness (or the so-called ‘looking-on 
phenomenon). Some personalities claim they have phenomenological access to 
other personality states. It is not completely clear what this involves, but those 
patients’ so-called alters who claim to experience it say they have an intimate 
and immediate observer-role in relation to other alters’ thoughts and actions.”); 
id. at 42 (suggesting “that amnesia with regard to important personal 
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vested in the alter, with the real self again reduced to the 
status of observer or onlooker. Sometimes the real self can’t 
recollect what the alien self did, but not always. Sometimes, 
like the sleepwalker, he catches and recalls snippets of what 
happened. Of course, an alien self doesn’t really take control. 
That’s what the first theory says: it takes the metaphor 
literally. The second theory, in contrast, takes the alien-self 
metaphor as just that: a metaphor used to make sense of lost 
agency. 
Compare Denny-Shaffer to Jane. Jane has been 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, including delusions of alien 
control. She too kidnaps a baby, experiencing no sense of 
agency at the time. She delusionally attributes her acts to 
the work of some force external to herself. She might not 
know what to make of this external force, let alone give it a 
name and personality. All she states with confidence is that 
she wasn’t the one in command when the baby was taken. 
Unlike Jane, who doesn’t give her alien overseer a name, 
Denny-Shaffer did. Indeed, she did more than give it a name. 
She delusionally invested it with a personality different, 
though perhaps not entirely different,160 from her own. Still, 
Denny-Shafter’s alien self was arguably just a delusion, 
albeit an exceptionally elaborate one, not a separate person 
commandeering her body from time to time.161 
Multiple Personality Disorder is sometimes thought to 
send the law of insanity into a tailspin, and indeed it does, 
 
information in DID is often to be understood in terms of the difficulty of 
incorporating traumatic and depersonalized or delusional experiences into 
autobiographical memory”). 
 160. Alters tend to be stock characters. “One study reports that in 85% of the 
cases of DID there is a child alter, in 53% of the cases there is an opposite gender 
alter, in 52% of the cases there is a promiscuous alter; 22% of alters were judged 
to be hypomanic or manic and 38% were judged to be psychotic.” See id. at 35. 
 161. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews, Identity, Control and Responsibility: 
The Case of Dissociative Identity Disorder, 15 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 509, 511 (2002) 
(“[S]omeone with DID is an individual human person whose psychiatric 
symptoms . . . are akin to a species of global self-delusion. So-called alter 
personalities are not to be regarded as metaphysically separate entities from the 
person, but rather count as altered states of that person.”) (emphasis added). 
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but only if multiples are multiple people in one body (the first 
theory), and only if insanity is, as the traditional and MPC 
tests say, a matter of incapacity resulting from mental 
disease or defect. If the alter who commits the crime suffers 
from no such incapacity, and if the host, when back in charge, 
suffers from no such incapacity, where’s the insanity? In 
contrast, if MPD involves multiple selves in one person (in 
one body) (the second theory), and if insanity is understood 
as consisting in lost agency, the problem goes away. Far from 
being a problem case for insanity, MPD cases rather turn out 
to be paradigm cases of insanity. Sybil turns out to be 
insanity’s poster child. 
IV. M’NAGHTEN, AGAIN 
We end where we began, with Daniel M’Naghten. When 
M’Naghten shot Drummond, did he act with a sense of 
agency, or had that sense abandoned him? If he retained his 
sense of agency, then he was sane; if not, then insane. 
Alas, it’s hard to tell. Someone watching him from afar 
would surely think he was in command as he approached 
Drummond, removed the pistol from his coat, fired, and then 
tried to reach for another pistol to fire again. Still, 
appearances can deceive. M’Naghten’s body could act with 
purpose even if M’Naghten wasn’t at the helm.162 Indeed, 
though seldom remarked upon,163 M’Naghten’s defense at 
trial was based almost entirely on the claim that (in some 
 
 162. The expert defense witnesses testified that M’Naghten suffered primarily 
from persecutory delusions, as well as delusions of reference, both of which can 
arguably rise from a lost sense agency. Dr. Munro testified that M’Naghten stated 
that “he had seen paragraphs in The Times newspaper containing allusions 
which he was satisfied were directed at him; he had also seen articles in the 
Glasgow Herald, beastly and atrocious, insinuating things untrue and 
insufferable of him . . . .” SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 212–13. 
 163. For an exception, see Eigen, supra note 50, at 45 (“The most articulate 
pairing of delusion with loss of self-control was made only at the very end of the 
period under review, during the trial of Daniel McNaughtan.”). 
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sense) he couldn’t control himself,164 not that he didn’t know 
he was committing a crime. Consider the following bits of 
uncontested testimony from the defense doctors: 
Dr. Munro: “The act with which he is charged, coupled with the his-
tory of his past life, leaves not the remotest doubt on my mind of the 
presence of insanity sufficient to deprive the prisoner of all self-con-
trol.”165 
 Dr. Morison: “[His delusions] deprived the prisoner of all restraint 
over his actions.”166 
 Dr. M’Clure: “I consider when he fired at Mr. Drummond, at 
Charing Cross, he was suffering from an hallucination which de-
prived him of all ordinary restraint.”167 
 Dr. Hutcheson: “The prisoner had lost all self-control at the mo-
ment he fired at Mr. Drummond. The act flowed immediately from 
the delusion. . . . [T]he act was the consequence of the delusion, 
which was irresistible.”168 
What were these doctors saying? Someone versed in the 
long-standing debate between cognitive and volitional 
insanity tests might think the answer is obvious, and maybe 
it is. Maybe the doctors were saying M’Naghten suffered 
from an “irresistible impulse” or lacked the power to control 
himself when he shot Drummond. M’Naghten, due to a 
mental disease or defect, couldn’t have chosen otherwise. 
Simple as that.169 If so, then however delusional he was, he 
 
 164. The opinion in M’Naghten, in its summary of the “substance” of the 
medical testimony, said: “[I]t was of the nature of the disease with which the 
prisoner was affected, to go on gradually until it had reached a climax, when it 
burst forth with irresistible intensity: that a man might go on for years quietly, 
though at the same time under its influence, but would all at once break out into 
the most extravagant and violent paroxysms.” M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. 
Rep 718, 719. 
 165. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 213. Dr. Munro was a physician with thirty 
years’ experience practicing at Bethlem. 
 166. Id. at 220. Dr. Morison was “a physician at St. Luke’s Hospital and also 
affiliated with Bethlem Hospital and the Surrey Asylum.” Id. at 219. 
 167. Id. at 220. Dr. M’Clure was a “London surgeon who had accompanied 
Munro and Morison in the prison examination of M’Naghten.” Id. 
 168. Id. Dr. Hutcheson was a “physician to the Royal Lunatic Asylum in 
Glasgow.” Id. 
 169. Or maybe their testimony should be taken as a testament to the idea that 
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should have been convicted under the traditional test if he 
realized he was committing a crime, and if, for example, he 
would’ve stopped himself if a gallows had suddenly 
materialized before his eyes as he approached Drummond 
from behind, and if he believed he’d be hung from it if he 
pulled the trigger. 
Yet maybe the doctors were saying, or trying to say, 
something very different. Maybe all the talk about self-
control and restraint wasn’t really about M’Naghten’s 
capacity to conform to the law. Maybe instead it was about 
lost agency. Maybe the doctors were trying to say, albeit 
using the language of self-control, that M’Naghten wasn’t in 
command at the time he killed Drummond. Someone or 
something else was. That something or someone else might 
or might not have pulled the trigger if the gallows appeared. 
But that doesn’t matter, according to the lost-agency theory. 
If M’Naghten wasn’t at the helm when his body shot 
Drummond, the alien self’s capacity to have chosen 
otherwise is beside the point. All that matters is that 
M’Naghten wasn’t in control. For if he wasn’t in control, he 
wasn’t responsible for pulling the trigger. He was insane. 
We usually assume when someone’s body moves, he or 
she is the one moving it. That assumption usually holds, but 
not when insanity takes hold. The insane actor’s mind and 
body commit the crime, but the mind and body committing 
the crime are not under his command. They’ve been 
commandeered. The choices his mind makes, the reasons 
moving his mind to make those choices, and the bodily 
movements resulting from those choices, are no longer 
experienced as his choices or his reason or his movements. 
An alien self is the one pulling the strings. It would therefore 
make no more sense to blame him for the crime resulting 
from those choices, reasons and movements than it would be 
to blame you or me. Blame presupposes a sense of agency, 
 
cognitive and volitional impairments amounting to insanity can’t, in the end, so 
easily be distinguished and kept separate from each other.  
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and insanity precludes blame because insanity defeats the 
sense of agency. 
Everyone agrees that insanity blocks criminal liability. 
The challenge has long been to explain why. Perhaps 
insanity blocks liability because insanity is incapacity, and 
incapacity blocks liability. So says the traditional theory. Or 
perhaps insanity blocks liability because insanity is 
irrationality, and irrationality blocks liability. So say the 
irrationality theories. Neither of these accounts fully 
satisfies. That dissatisfaction prompts the search for another 
explanation. Perhaps, instead, insanity blocks liability, not 
because the insane are compelled or irrational, but because 
they choose and act without a sense of agency. So says the 
lost-agency theory. An insane actor is, quite literally, out of 
his mind.170 
 
 170. If insanity does indeed consist in lost agency, the upshot is ironic. Here’s 
the irony: Determinism tells us that we’re not really in control of what we do, at 
least not if being in control means having the contra-causal capacity to choose 
otherwise, and at least not if we lack that capacity. Be that as it may, our brains 
trick us into thinking that we do have it. The only ones whose brains don’t trick 
them are those that lack a sense of agency. So if it’s crazy to think we have contra-
causal powers, then the only ones who aren’t crazy are the insane. Cf. KEAN, 
supra note 80, at 264 (“[V]ictims of alien hand syndrome and other syndromes 
may have simply lost the illusion of free will for part of their bodies. In some 
sense, they might be closer to the reality of how the brain works than the rest of 
us. Makes you wonder who’s really deluded.”). 
